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This dissertation is a collection of studies on the economics of peace and
security. Chapter one introduces the roles military spending and conflict
play in affecting economic growth, while also considering the causes of civil
conflict.
Chapter two investigates the relationship between military expenditure
and economic growth, considering group heterogeneity and non-linearity. Us-
ing an exogenous growth model and dynamic panel approach, the results
suggest military burden to have a negative effect on growth. Breaking the
overall panel down into various sub-samples shows estimates that are remark-
ably consistent with the full panel. These results provide strong support for
the argument that military spending has an adverse effect on growth. There
are, however, some intriguing results suggesting that for certain types of
countries military burden has no negative growth effect.
Chapter three deals with the transnational spatial spillover effects of con-
flict on neighbouring countries. It moves beyond using geographical dis-
tance as a spillover measurement and allows for economic and political dis-
tances. The initial empirical results suggest that conflict has a strong nega-
tive spillover effect on directly contiguous countries growth, but no significant
impacts were observed for non-contiguous countries. When economic and po-
litical factors are considered, this result remains, but the spillover effect is
smaller. While the impact of conflict remains devastating, it is important to
take other factors into account as studies using only geographical distance
may be overestimating the impact on neighbours.
The fourth chapter examines the determinants of civil war, using a zero-
inflated modelling approach to deal with excess zeroes in the dependent vari-
able. Traditional probit and logit models have limited capacity in dealing
with this issue and can create misleading results, which is illustrated through
replicating published work. A general greed-grievance model is then esti-
mated giving further support to using zero-inflated models. While the stan-
dard probit models tend to emphasise opportunity variables, consistent in
other studies, the zero-inflated model gives supports both opportunity and
grievance variables. In particular, ethnicity, democracy and inequality are
found to play a significant role in civil war prevalence.
Finally, chapter five summarises the findings of the dissertation, provid-
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CHAPTER 1
An Introduction To Military Spending, Conflict and
Economic Growth
1.1 Introduction
Economics of peace and security is a sub-field of economics that seeks to
understand the causes and effects of violent conflict and military spending.
In each case, the primary concerns is finding ways each can be avoided, man-
aged or in the case of conflict, resolved. These aspects are often thought
to be intertwined, leading to clear and significant relationships between mil-
itary spending, conflict and economic growth. For instance, almost every
single country in the world spends on the military, with spending ranging
from an astonishing 35% of GDP to as low as 0%. While the developed na-
tions often can afford to allocate a proportion of their government budget to
military expenditure, most non-developed countries have astonishing levels
of poverty and governments that continue to devote a substantial portion of
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their resources to military spending. Military spending in these developing
countries is often unaffordable and unsustainable, which leads to important
developmental concerns. One that as early as Benoit (1973) who found a
positive correlation between development and military spending and started
a vigorous debate that continues to this day.
A similar comparison can be drawn on the link between conflict and eco-
nomic development, with the causality thought to flow from conflict to devel-
opment (Rodrik, 1999). The cost of conflict is considerable. During a war,
the growth rate of a country is typically reduced by 2.2% (Collier, 1999).
These losses can continue post-war, with Cerra and Saxena (2008) finding
output to decline by about 6% after a civil war. From a macroeconomic view
point, conflict is generally harmful to economic growth and this is almost al-
ways the result of devastating effects on life, health and infrastructure, which
leads to poverty and decreased living standards. This harmful effect not only
affects the host nation, but neighbouring countries as well, with its spillover
effects numerous and non-trivial (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002a).
Since both military spending and conflict can affect economic growth, an
overlap between these respective literatures is the causes of conflict. With
conflict potentially having such devastating effects, an important research
question is what causes conflict. Considerable empirical research has been
generated by the “greed-grievance” debate which was started by Collier and
Hoeffler (1998) and Keen (1998). Together with Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
and Fearon and Laitin (2003), the authors argued that theoretically conflict
can be caused by long standing differences in ethnicity and religion, lack of
democracy, economic inequalities or poverty. Yet, from a statistical perspec-
tive the only explanation is that of poverty or lack of development. When
economic, political and social characteristics have been considered, countries
that are poorer, slower growing and subject to adverse income shocks are
substantially more at risk to civil conflict (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). In
other words, it is variables relating to greed or opportunity that explain civil
war risk and not those of objective grievance. Even though there is a general
consensus on the correlates of civil war following these initial contributions,
2
the debate on the appropriate estimators used, measurement of the variables
and the true underlying causes of civil conflict remain (Blattman and Miguel,
2010).
Given that both violent conflict and military expenditure both retard
growth or development and that low development causes civil conflict, the
importance and relevance of academic research surrounding the interactions
of military expenditure, conflict and growth is clear and justifiable. This
thesis has three broad objectives, which are covered in the next three chap-
ters. These are to investigate the economic effects of military spending with
specific focus on group heterogeneity and non-linearity, the costs of armed
conflict and its transnational link on neighbouring nations, and the role eco-
nomic, political and social variables play in determining civil war risk when
more appropriate rare events estimators are used. In this way this thesis
makes useful contributions to understanding the vicious cycle of underdevel-
opment, conflict and military spending that too many countries fall into.
1.2 Guns vs. Butter
A major research endeavour in economics has been trying to understand
the forces that determine economic growth and factors which cause different
countries to grow at different rates and achieve different levels of wealth.
Research has shown a broad range of factors that affect sustained economic
growth, these vary from the general notion of conditional convergence, invest-
ment, trade and institutions, to the rather less familiar impact of military
expenditure and conflict (Barro, 1991; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Dollar and
Kraay, 2004; Collier, 1999; Dunne et al., 2005).1
Military spending is an important topic for the international community.
It has influences beyond the resources it takes up, especially when it facil-
itates conflict. Although military spending temporarily decreased following
1Exogenous and endogenous growth theory have found growth rates to be enhanced by
higher initial schooling and life expectancy, lower inflation and access to technology.
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the end of the Cold War, increases have been seen since the late 1990’s, rising
to over $1.7 trillion per year. This is equivalent to about 2.3% of global gross
domestic product (GDP)(SIPRI, 2014).2 Moreover, in spite of the ongoing
global economic crisis, this trend of high defence spending is continuing and
demonstrates that often principles of security are seen as more important
than considerations of economic conditions. The literature on the economic
effects of military expenditure remains strongly contested, with arguments
mainly over its true effects.
The controversy in the literature over military spending’s effect on devel-
opment are divided among three groups. Those against military expenditure
argue that even though most countries need some form of security to deal
with internal and external threats, any resources used carry an opportunity
cost as this redirects resources away from activities that may directly im-
prove economic growth and the pace of development (Knight et al., 1996).
On the other hand, military spending may help boost growth if it can provide
security, jobs, infrastructure, training and research and development (R&D)
(Benoit, 1978; Aizenman and Glick, 2006). These differences in opinions over
whether military expenditure has a positive or negative effect on economic
growth has led some authors such as Alexander (1990), Ram (1995) and
Alptekin and Levine (2012) to point towards the use of different datasets
time-periods and empirical models as the main reasons behind the different
findings. The issue is then clearly not theoretical, but an empirical question
and one that remains an area of considerable debate. In fact, it is very dif-
ficult to find any robust empirical relationship between defence and growth
(Dunne, 1996; Smith, 2000).
Although past research has not been able to provide a consensus on the
economic effects of military spending, more recent cross country studies,
using mostly post Cold War data do seem to be providing more consis-
tent support for a negative relationship between defence and growth (Dunne
2The only reliable data is the aggregate military expenditure and not any of its compo-
nents and in any empirical analysis often one can do no more than simply recognise that
armed transfers are an important part of military expenditure.
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and Tian, 2013). There remain concerns over group heterogeneity and non-
linearity as studies of a cross sectional nature often hide more complex pat-
terns. For example, in most developing countries, heterogeneity exists re-
garding the level of insecurities, stages and nature of development, amounts
of trade, natural resource abundance and official development aid received.
These differences may account for the substantial amounts of variation in
past empirical estimations. Smaldone (2006) suggests that differences in
military expenditure’s effect on growth may reflect a country’s conflict expe-
rience, while Yakovlev (2007) argues results may differ depending on arms
trade and Looney and McNab (2008) found economic freedom and gover-
nance to influence military spending’s burden on growth. These mixed re-
sults in the literature have pushed researchers to argue that there also exists
a non-linear relation between military expenditure and growth. The authors
postulate that the effect military spending has on growth is dependent on
the level spent and the level of a countries income (Stroup and Sharp, 2001;
Dunne, 2012). Low levels of military spending may increase growth and high
levels reduce growth, while poorer countries are less able to afford military
spending than richer ones.
Motivated by a need to further investigate the above-mentioned claims,
chapter two provides an assessment of the importance of group heterogeneity
and non-linearity. This includes evaluating the role different country char-
acteristics have on the military spending growth relation. By emphasising
the importance of controlling for country specific factors, this study helps
distinguish between countries that experience the harmful effects of defence
spending to those that do not. In doing so, it also offers explanations to why
certain characteristics matter and through which channels these variables af-
fect the military spending growth relation. Thus, one can see this study as
providing a robustness check on the defense-growth nexus.
Following Dunne et al.’s (2005) theoretical model, military expenditure
is estimated on economic growth through an augmented Solow model. The
growth equation can be specified to include the usual growth variables and
military spending as a percentage of GDP. Using a dynamic panel estimation
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technique on 106 countries over a 21-year period, this chapter finds defence
spending to have an adverse effect on economic growth. It adds to the grow-
ing consensus that in the post-Cold War era, defence spending is harmful to
development.
1.3 Spillover Effects of Conflict
Violent conflict has always been a relatively common phenomenon, but one
that has recently changed from predominantly interstate conflicts to more
intrastate conflicts (Collier et al., 2003). These wars are also persistent, their
duration has steadily increased over the past half century (Fearon, 2004).
Understanding the causes and consequences of violent conflict is therefore of
vital importance. Blattman and Miguel (2010) correctly pointed out that
development economists have often overlooked conflict and many economic
courses and textbooks do not have conflict as part of their syllabi. Recently
though, more and more economists have started to work to better understand
its causes and legacies.
The economic legacies of violent conflict are generally considered to dev-
astate economic development and the effects are wide ranging not only for
the countries directly affected, but also for neighbours. These harmful costs
are both economic and social, with effects in the short, medium and long-
term (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Short and medium term costs gener-
ally arise during conflict with immediate impacts on factors of production
(physical capital, labour or human capital), technology, institutions and cul-
ture. Longer-term or legacy costs are often only visible after a conflict and
are commonly in the social, institutional and environmental form (Dunne,
2013). Most scholars agree that short and medium run impact of conflict is
clearly disastrous. There is, however, mixed evidence on its long-run costs
with differing opinions. These range from substantial social, institutional
and psychological legacy costs of conflict as suggested by Collier et al. (2003)
to few visible economic legacies as argued by Miguel and Roland (2006) to
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conflict having potentially a modernising effect in the long-term process of
economic development (Ruttan, 2006).
Most costs resulting from conflict can be considered to have a dispropor-
tionate effect on poorer countries. As historical evidence suggest, poorest
countries in urgent need of economic development are often the ones em-
broiled in violent fighting with devastating effects (Blattman and Miguel,
2010). These wars range from mild skirmishes in countries such as Burk-
ina Faso to large scale massacres in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) and Sudan. In Rwanda, for example, over 20% of the population
moved into poverty following the genocide (Justino and Verwimp, 2006).
An even worse case was seen in the DRC, where during the Second Congo
War, an estimated 3.9 million people had died, with most attributed to poor
healthcare, malnutrition and deterioration of infrastructure (Coghlan et al.,
2007). Some have argued that these disproportionate and destructive effects
may be so great that it could account for the income gap between the world’s
richest and poorest countries (Collier et al., 2003). This led to an important
developmental concern and in order to help these countries recover (e.g. hu-
manitarian aid) one must be able to ascertain the full consequences of the
conflict.
While the empirical literature on the costs of conflict has been growing,
the spillover effects of conflict have greatly been neglected. These contagion
effects resulting from conflict are both important and considerable (Black,
2013; Bosker and Ree, 2014). Refugee flows, disease, illicit trade of banned
goods and conflict itself can spillover into neighbouring countries, substan-
tially hampering economic growth in those countries as well as the region
(Murdoch and Sandler, 2004; de Groot, 2010). This recent move to assess
the conflict spillover is important, but it has been limited to using only geog-
raphy as a distance measurement. Instead, spatial econometric studies should
consider other factors of distance such as political and economic similarities
(Beck et al., 2006).
Chapter three adds to the debate in the literature by investigating the
transnational spillover effects of conflict on economic growth for Africa, con-
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sidering an integrated distance measure that includes geographic, economic
and political factors. A dynamic panel analysis of the spillover effects of con-
flict in Africa is undertaken using a contiguity matrix that reflects distance in
geographic, economic and political terms. Annual data is used instead of the
popular five year averages, with results providing useful and valuable contri-
butions to the growing conflict spillover literature. Spillover effects resulting
from conflict are likely to be different for countries with different amounts of
economic integration, political similarity and geographic distance, therefore
using a more comprehensive spillover measure could help to more accurately
measure the spillover effects of conflict. The estimation results with the
contiguity matrix reflecting geographic, political and economic similarities
supports the notion that violent conflict in a host nation leads to substantial
multi-dimensional spillover effects onto neighbouring countries.
1.4 Determinants of Civil War
Just as measuring the costs of conflict is an important developmental concern,
understanding the factors that make conflict, in particular civil war, more or
less likely to occur is also of great importance. It helps policy makers and
scholars formulate responses to decrease future civil war risk and set a foun-
dation for persistent economic growth. Violent internal conflict has ravaged
many states in the world. According to the UCDP/PRIO data set, counting
all countries and years since 1960, the average annual prevalence of civil war
is about 12%, with a peak of over 17% in the years 1990 and 1991. The cu-
mulative battle related deaths in worldwide civil conflicts between 1960 and
2013 is close to 8 million, with total war deaths around 18 million (Lacina
and Gleditsch, 2005; Themner and Wallensteen, 2014). To understand the
forces behind this source of human misery, research on why civil war occurs
have thus become a major focus, creating a vast body of quantitative and
qualitative literature that analyses issues such as civil war onset, incidence,
duration, termination and severity (Cunningham and Lemke, 2014).
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Focusing on the causes of civil conflict, the literature has been dominated
by cross-country regressions, with the correlates of war reasonably well estab-
lished. Civil conflict, an increasingly common phenomenon, can be explained
through the general concepts of motivation and feasibility. This is a distinc-
tion made obvious by Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) contribution on whether
greed or grievance explains civil conflict onset. Rebellion can be motivated
by a need to redress objective grievances or by opportunities that generate
private gain (e.g. greed). However, participation by rebels can also be due to
feasibility of collective co-ordination or conflict success. Civil wars are con-
sidered more likely to occur in countries that are poor, are subject to income
shocks, have weak institutions, have sparsely populated regions outside city
centres that possess mountainous or forest terrain (Blattman and Miguel,
2010). This is an assertion that has mostly been empirically backed up in
the literature. Early studies by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and
Hoeffler (2004) suggest economic incentives are decisive in predicting civil
wars, while political grievances have little explanatory power. These authors
link their findings to weak state capacity and low opportunity cost facing
rebels as the main explanations to engendering war.
From these seminal contributions, the literature on the causes of civil
conflict has branched into numerous avenues with recent research focusing on
improving causal identification and measurement. Although there is a general
consensus linking civil conflict to low levels of income and negative income
shocks, the direction of the causation remains contested. To address this
endogeneity concern, scholars have looked to isolate the exogenous variation
in income, choosing rainfall as an instrument for income growth (Miguel
et al., 2004). To illustrate the importance of better measurement, Ross (2006)
argue that compared to older natural resource measures, improved measures
of oil and diamond deposits are strongly associated with more civil conflict.
Likewise, the lack of significance of the objective grievance variables has
been strongly contest in political science. Most recently by Buhaug et al.
(2014), who suggests that the lack of significance in the grievance variables
may be due to poorly measured proxy variables (e.g. Gini coefficient and
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ethno-linguistic fractionalisation) used in previous research. They find that
by using variables which better reflect ethnic and income inequality, political
and economic grievances do matter.
While there are advancements in the civil war literature to deal with issues
such as endogeneity and measurement, some core empirical questions remain.
There is currently little agreement on the correct econometric specification
in estimating civil war prevalence (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Authors
also vary in the use of annual versus five-year averages, the definition of civil
conflict, the appropriate estimator for these rare events, the degree of mea-
surement error in the dependent and independent variables and the concern
of an excess number of zero observations in the dependent variable. In light
of this, chapter four looks to revisit the civil war literature of greed versus
grievance, viewing and addressing issues on the excess zeroes in the depen-
dent variable, the definition of civil conflict, its appropriate estimators and
potential measurement errors.
The chapter first addresses the definition of conflict in the literature.
Cross-country studies commonly use a zero-one indicator variable to denote
conflict and peace and in most cases this dependent variable contains a large
number of zero observations (e.g. peace observations). These zeroes have the
potential to be heterogeneous and come from different data generating pro-
cesses. In the case where zeroes are heterogeneous, estimates which use the
popular probit or logit models to determine civil war risk can lead to model
misspecification and biased estimates (Bagozzi et al., 2015). Additionally,
whether the probit and logit models conform to the process that generated
the civil conflict data have been questioned, with some authors favouring
Poisson models since it is like to better fit the data (Richardson, 1960; Smith
and Tasiran, 2012).
To investigate the concerns of excess zeroes and which models best fit
the data, this chapter contributes to the literature by suggesting that in a
case of excess zeroes in the dependent variable, the appropriate estimator
should be a split-population or zero-inflated model that is in a Poisson form.
By revisiting the Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) study on the determinants
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of civil war, applying a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) to their data and com-
paring these results to their probit estimations, differences were found with
potentially substantial implications. In light of the findings from this data
replication, the greed versus grievance debate is re-evaluated on an updated
panel of annual data for 134 countries between the period 1960 to 2013. Us-
ing this more appropriate estimator that accounts for excess zeroes that are
heterogeneous, the results suggest evidence of substantial differences between
the probit and ZIP estimators. A comparison of the results show regressions
which use the ZIP model to consistently outperform ordinary probits.
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CHAPTER 2
Military Spending, Heterogeneity and Economic Growth
2.1 Introduction
There is a large and growing literature documenting the effects of military
spending on economic growth that reflects a continued lack of consensus.
This has allowed researchers to revisit earlier analyses and identify definitive
effects of military spending which continues to be the subject of considerable
debate. With the end of the Cold War came substantial changes in the
geopolitical environment, leading to sizeable reductions in worldwide military
expenditure. However, in recent years (since 2000), this declining trend has
bottomed out and military spending is once again on the increase, albeit
drops in the ”West” were experienced in the years 2013 and 2014 (SIPRI,
2014). In conjunction with the end of the Cold War was a fall in conflict
incidence, a phenomenon that has also increased in recent years.
Pressures to increase military expenditure can be the result of a coun-
try’s strategic or security needs, while another avenue to such increases can
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be thought of as consequences of decisions made by vested interests. These
vested interests, commonly known as military industrial complexes, may be
individuals, institutions or organisations that specifically profit from defence
spending at the cost of the rest of the economy. For example, following
Greece’s default on its debts and its implementation of austerity measures af-
ter the 2008 global recession, it remains the country with the highest defence
spending in the EU (SIPRI, 2014). As Greece cut spending on healthcare,
salaries and pensions, continued arms procurements and repayments were
made to countries like France and Germany (Grebe and Sommer, 2010).
In 2014 the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) re-
ported that worldwide military expenditure in 2013 reached 1.75 trillion US
dollars, representing 2.4 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) or
equivalent to over $250 per person. These figures highlight the economic
significance of military expenditure and raise questions regarding its likely
impact on development. At a basic level, it is obvious that military spend-
ing matters. Witness, for example, the divergent paths of the developing
world and the West. Following the recent global recession, while western
countries continue to cut military spending amid austerity policies, no such
phenomenon was seen in the rest of the developing world. Despite falls in
GDP growth and investment, every region and sub-region outside the West
continues to increase military spending (SIPRI, 2014). This highlights that
often considerations in defence spending are made outside economic condi-
tions.
In an environment where most developing governments has been pushing
to increase GDP growth, foreign direct investment and to decrease poverty,
many believe that continued pushes to raise military spending can be seen as
counter-productive. Some economists argue that military spending helps deal
with a country’s internal and external treats, provides technology spillovers
and employment to the general public, but one may also argue that such
spending does come with opportunity costs (Aizenman and Glick, 2006;
Dunne, 2012). Resources that have been diverted to military expenditure
could be used for other developmental purposes which might improve welfare
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by a far greater amount. Such issues are particularly relevant in developing
countries as they are more likely to be exposed to poor economic performance
or episodes of conflict. Yet, it is these developing economies that continue to
drive for higher military expenditures.
While military expenditure and economic growth can be viewed as a rele-
vant and important issues, most empirical estimates of their effects are often
contradictory or inconclusive. Some of the confusion and mixed results are
due to non-linear relationships between military spending and growth and
group heterogeneity within the overall sample. Cross-country studies often
hide numerous complex patterns with differences in areas such as levels of
security, income, economic growth and conflict experience. These differences
can lead to substantial amounts of variation in past empirical studies and
thus inconclusive results. Aizenman and Glick (2006) argue that when levels
of threat are considered, linear models lead to inconsistent estimates since
the relationship between economic growth and military spending is actually
non-linear, while Smaldone (2006) suggests that the relationship between mil-
itary spending and economic growth is heterogeneous reflecting a country’s
conflict experience.
To further investigate the above mentioned claims, the objective of this
chapter is two-fold. First, it explores possible non-linearities between mil-
itary spending and economic growth. Second, the chapter examines group
heterogeneity within the sample of countries and considers the effect of mili-
tary burden on growth. The general estimation method used here follows
a dynamic first order model with fixed effects. The data is based on a
post-Cold War balanced panel of 106 countries from 1988 to 2010 and to
the author’s knowledge, the data set used is the most complete and reliable
within the literature. The next section reviews the existing literature on the
military spending growth relation. This is followed by an exposition of the
growth model based on Dunne et al. (2005), which overcomes some of the
limitations of earlier models, and previous and current estimation methods.
Section four offers a discussion of the dataset and introduces the variables
used in sub-sample stratification. Section five presents the estimation results
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of the overall sample and considers issues of non-linearity and group hetero-
geneity, which specifically evaluates the role different country characteristics
have on the military spending growth relation. The final section presents
some conclusions.
2.2 Military Expenditure and Growth Nexus
2.2.1 Theoretical Considerations
It has been commonly agreed that a theoretical model is quintessential for
any empirical work, but much of economic theory does not provide an ex-
plicit role for military spending as a distinct activity and thus no obvious
theoretical choice is available. Since there is no agreed theory for economists
to agree upon, in order to properly incorporate military spending into eco-
nomic growth various schools of thought have emerged (Dunne and Coulomb,
2008). These include the Neoclassical, Keynesian, Institutional and Marxist
perspectives, which allowed researchers to identify numerous channels link-
ing military expenditure to economic growth and help theorise its potential
effects. These different channels can then be grouped into three major cate-
gories: demand, supply and security, with its effects considered to either be
positive, negative or no relation.
The first theoretical approach linking military spending to economic de-
velopment is from the dominant neoclassical perspective, which is generally
expressed through the supply side channel. This perspective considers the
state as a rational actor that balances the security benefits and opportunity
costs of military expenditure in order to maximise national interest. Here,
military expenditure is seen as a public good and its economic effects are
determined by opportunity costs: the trade off between it and other forms
of government spending, more commonly known as ”guns versus butter”.
This competition for resources, namely, capital (e.g. physical and human),
labour, technology and natural resources result in these being unavailable
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for civilian use; hence the opportunity cost of military spending. However,
the resultant effect of military expenditure on the economy through the lens
the neoclassical approach is still a lively debate. Authors such as Mylonidis
(2008) describe crowding out of public and private investment, adverse bal-
ance of payment within arms importing countries, inefficient bureaucracies,
fewer civilian services and R&D activities are just some of the possible oppor-
tunity costs associated with higher levels of military expenditure. Yet, others
argue military R&D may result in development of improved technologies with
beneficial spillovers into the civilian sector.
In contrast, the Keynesian and Institutional perspective and are associ-
ated with both demand and supply side effects. These two approaches see the
state as a proactive entity which utilises state funds on military expenditure
as a means of increasing output through a Keynesian multiplier effect (Dunne
and Uye, 2010). Combining with the Keynesian perspective, the institution-
alists focus on high military spending leading to industrial inefficiencies and
the development of powerful interest groups (i.e military industrial complex)
that benefit from military expenditure. In the presence of ineffective aggre-
gate demand, increases in military expenditure from the demand channel
can lead to increased capacity utilisation, higher profits and subsequently
rising investment and growth. From the supply side, military expenditure
is viewed as an opportunity cost which may crowd of physical and human
capital investment. Clearly, the extent of the effects pointed out will dif-
fer depending on country characteristics and is often impossible to deduce
through theory whether the net effect of military expenditure on output is
positive or negative.
Arguments from the Marxist perspective view the creation of larger de-
fence sectors as a way means for capitalist development and escaping from
the fall in the rate of profit. By investing in the defence sector, countries
delay the collapse of the capitalist mode of production (Coulomb and Bel-
lais, 2008). While military spending has an inherently negative effect on
the economy, in a capitalist state that is often characterised as having over-
production and stagnation, military spending contributes towards aggregate
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demand without adding to aggregate supply, thus allowing firms to reduce
their surplus, sell the goods and realise profits (Gottheil, 1986; Riddle, 1986).
Another perspective comes from the international relations perspective. If
there is an absence of international cooperation to reduce political tensions,
higher military spending can be used by a country to ensure its own security
in the region. Thompson (1974) argued that military expenditure can be
economically productive since it enhances a state’s security and protects
its population and property rights from internal and external threats which
will encourage private investment and growth. However, as always, there
is a counter-argument suggesting higher military expenditure can have no
impact on a states security, but can even worsen it through potentially being
dragged into an arms race (i.e. Between Pakistan and India, and Turkey and
Greece).1 Also, where military expenditure is not driven by basic security
needs, it is often the result of rent-seeking activities which can potentially
provoke damaging conflicts.
As these various theoretical perspectives mentioned above suggest, the
question of whether and to what extent military spending has an economi-
cally positive or negative effect cannot be resolved by use of anecdotal ev-
idence and historical observations, but instead requires rigorous empirical
analysis. The analysis must be able to challenge the numerous estimation
problems, provide a consistent picture to the causation of military spending
on economic development and can be applied to real world scenarios. It is
to this that the literature review now turns.
2.2.2 Related Literature
In applied work, the relationship between military expenditure and develop-
ment is often restricted to the use of economic growth rather than develop-
1Knight et al. (1996) found that for the period 1972-90 higher military spending in the
Middle East and Eastern Europe failed to achieve any improvements in security while low
levels of military spending in the Western developing countries showed low incidences of
major armed conflicts.
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ment because of the problems in defining and measuring development. The
empirical debate over the relation between military expenditure and growth
was started by Benoit (1973, 1978), where he surprised many development
economists by presenting a positive cross-country association between mil-
itary spending and economic growth in least developed countries (LDCs).
This led to a large amount of research activity and an impressive build-up of
literature that has tended not to support Benoit’s initial findings. Opinions
on the effects of military spending are often divided among two groups: the
’pro’ group that views military spending as a guarantee to peace, security and
welfare, while the ’against’ group sees such spending as a wasteful enterprise
that influences the economy beyond the resources it consumes, especially if
it leads to or facilitates conflict. Although the effects of military expendi-
ture have been debated for over 40 years, the answer almost always remains
an empirical one. Irrespective of which perspective one takes the topic of
military spending is most definitely non-trivial, often leading to important
economic consequences for both developing and developed countries.
A number of researchers have tried to survey the existing literature; Ram
(1995), Dunne (1996) and Smith (2000) find no empirical regularity, posi-
tive or negative, though Smith did indicate that using more sophisticated
techniques could lead to a small negative effect in the long run. In the most
recent survey of 168 studies, Dunne and Tian (2013) found that increasing
the sample size to include more recent studies provided increasingly stronger
evidence of a negative effect of military expenditure on growth.2 A summary
of their results can be found in Table 2.1. Dividing the 168 studies into
different types, military spending was found to have negative effects on eco-
nomic growth in 44 and 31% of cross-country and case studies respectively.
Only between 20 and 25% of studies found positive effects, while about 40%
reported unclear results.3 There were earlier suggestions by Dunne and Uye
(2010) that increasing the proportion of post-cold war data might provide
more consistent results and this indeed seems to be the case, with almost 53%
2Extends and updates on an earlier survey by (Dunne and Uye, 2010).
3“Case studies” refers to single country of small groups of countries and the “unclear”
category means mixed or insignificant results.
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of post-cold war cross-country studies (e.g. using predominantly post-cold
war data) finding a negative military spending effect on growth.
Table 2.1: Summary Results
Total Number Findings (in percent)
of Studies Positive Negative Unclear
Type
Cross-Country 96 19.8 43.8 36.4
Case-Studies 72 25.0 30.6 44.4
Total 168 23.0 38.1 39.8
Pre-end to Cold War
Cross-Country 60 20.0 38.3 41.7
Case Studies 42 21.4 33.3 45.2
Total 102 21.6 35.3 43.1
Post-Cold War
Cross-Country 36 19.4 52.8 27.8
Case-Studies 30 30.0 26.7 43.3
Total 66 24.2 40.9 34.9
Source: Dunne and Tian (2013)
As recent studies in the literature, shown in Table 2.1, have started to find
more consistent results, there remains concerns regarding group heterogene-
ity and non-linearity. In considering group heterogeneity, Smaldone (2006)
finds that indeed for Africa the relationship between military spending and
growth is heterogeneous with differences in the results due to country’s ex-
perience with conflict. Dunne (2012) provides support to this claim with
Looney and McNab (2008) giving further emphasis on the group heterogene-
ity issue through differences in economic freedom and governance. As for
non-linearity, authors such as Yakovlev (2007), Tiwari and Shahbaz (2012)
and Stroup and Sharp (2001) find important non-linear relationships between
military spending and growth.
Following on from these contributions, this chapter estimates an exoge-
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nous growth model for a sample of 106 countries, stratifying into sub-samples
to provide a comprehensive and definitive assessment of heterogeneity and
non-linearity across income groups, conflict experience, natural resource abun-
dance, net recipients of aid, trade openness and measures of democracy. Con-
flict experience would seem to be an important potential source of hetero-
geneity. As mentioned, Smaldone (2006) argued that military burden within
Africa generally corresponds to the security realities and affects the relation-
ship between military spending and economic growth. As is common in the
literature, conflict is defined as having at least 25 battle-related deaths per
year, but a cumulative battle death of over 1 000 throughout the duration of
the conflict is also considered.
Natural resource endowment has been investigated as having an impact
on conflict and is also a good candidate for a factor that might influence
the relationship between military spending and growth. Collier and Hoef-
fler (2004) found that where rebellions or civil wars are motivated by greed,
primary commodity exports can substantially increase conflict risk. They ar-
gue that in the presence of natural resource abundance, opportunities arise
through extortion and looting of profits for those in control of the resource,
thus making conflict or rebellion feasible and perhaps even attractive. Other
research suggests similar hypotheses. Sarr et al. (2011) explains that in a
resource-rich country, an unchecked ruler can use resources as collateral and
facilitate acquisition of loans and loot the economy. It certainly seems rea-
sonable to suggest that resource abundance countries differ in their relation
between military spending and growth. Following conventions in the litera-
ture, natural resource dependence is measured as the ratio of mineral exports
to total exports. A country is considered natural resource dependent if min-
eral exports constitute more than 25% of a country’s total exports, a measure
that is consistent with the International Monetary Funds (IMF’s) definition
of export dependence.
Another potentially important variable is foreign aid. In the conflict lit-
erature, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) identify diaspora and their impact on
conflict through flows of funds that can support insurrection, while in the
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growth literature impacts of aid on development is without consensus. Burn-
side and Dollar (2000) concluded that aid has a positive impact on growth in
developing countries with good policies (fiscal, monetary and trade) and no
impact in the presence of poor policies. On the other hand, Easterly et al.
(2004) and Hansen and Tarp (2000) rebut Burnside and Dollar (2000)’s claim
and find that aid works for countries with poor policies. While there is no
consensus regarding the impact of aid on growth, it is recognised that aid
fungibility can lead to indiscretionary spending, often in the form of military
expenditure. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that the impact of military
spending may differ between countries that are net aid recipients and those
that are non-recipients. Aid recipients are divided into three categories of
low, medium and high amounts of aid received.
A fourth issue that has been highlighted in the literature is the impact
of an economies openness on growth. There is currently no consensus, with
proponents of trade openness having a positive effect on development in-
cluding Edwards (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999) and Dollar and Kraay
(2004), while those that find trade openness to have a negative or no effect
on growth to be Yanikkaya (2003) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), respec-
tively. There is also a substantial literature on trade and conflict, suggesting
countries which trade are less likely to fight (Polachek, 2007). In addition,
involvement in arms trade can impact upon economic growth for a given level
of military expenditure (Yakovlev, 2007). In 2013, according to SIPRI, the
top 6 suppliers of arms in the world (Russia, USA, China, France, UK and
Germany) are also within the top 10 of the world’s top military spenders. Al-
though a select few countries are involved in arms exports, the majority of the
world’s economies are arms importers. In the case of trade openness, a more
open economy could represent greater net arms imports than the equivalent
closed economy. This represents an opportunity cost since resources used
for arms imports could be better used for developmental purposes. Trade
openness is calculated by taking the sum of a country’s imports and exports
and dividing that by its GDP. A country is defined as open if it is above the
value of the world average and vice versa for a closed economy.
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A final issue has to do with political institutions and its impact on mil-
itary spending. From an armed conflict perspective it has generally been
agreed that coherent democracies and harsh authoritarian states have the
least civil wars, with the prior being ruled through civil liberties and a choice
through voting, while the latter is ruled through extreme repression. As for
states most civil war prone, this rests with intermediate regimes such as weak
democracies, weak autocracies, transitional or new states (Hegre et al., 2001).
A reasonable link can be drawn towards military expenditure and growth.
For authoritarian or intermediate states, in order to stay in power, resources
are required to be expended on forces to keep its civilians, opposing parties
and potential rebels in check. These spending patterns on arms and its im-
pact can indeed differ in comparison to democracies, where resources can be
used to promote the welfare of the state. Political institutions is measured
using the popular polity variable, differentiation between the state’s political
position is in the form of a 21-point scale.
2.3 Modelling Military Expenditure and Eco-
nomic Growth
For the empirical analysis, the model developed by Dunne et al. (2005) is
used, whereby the effect of military spending on economic growth is based on
the augmented Solow growth model with Harrod-neutral technical progress.
Similar to that of Knight et al. (1996), military spending, measured as a
share of GDP (m = M/Y ), is assumed to affect factor productivity via a
level effect on the efficiency parameter, which controls Harrod-neutral tech-
nical change. Putting it differently, a permanent change in m does not affect
the long-run steady-state growth rate, but has the potential to have a per-
manent effect on per capita income along the steady-state growth path. The
share of military spending can also affect the transitory growth rates along
the path to the new steady-state equilibrium. To see this, consider an aug-
mented Solow growth model with an aggregate Neoclassical Cobb-Douglas
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production function featuring Harrod-neutral technological progress.
Y (t) = K(t)α[A(t)L(t)]1−α (2.1)
where α ∈ [0, 1], and t denotes time. Y denotes aggregate real income,




where g is the exogenous rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress and m
is the share of military expenditure in total output (GDP). The production
function is seen to exhibit constant returns to scale in its two factors: phys-
ical capital (K) and productivity augmented labour (AL). Together with
the standard Solow model assumptions of perfectly competitive inputs and
outputs, exogenous savings rate s, constant labour force growth rate n, and
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where the asterisk denotes the steady-state value of the variable. Having
found the steady-state level of capital stock, it is now possible to solve for the
steady-state value of output. Linearising (2.3) via a truncated Taylor series
expansion around the steady-state and substituting (2.4), the result is:4
∂ ln ke
∂t
= (α− 1)(n+ g + δ)[ln ke(t)− ln k∗e ] (2.5)
and since ln ye = ln
Y
AL
= α ln ke, then one can approximate the transitory
dynamic of income per effective worker around the steady-state as:
∂ ln ye
∂t
= (α− 1)(n+ g + δ)[ln ye(t)− ln y∗e ] (2.6)
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]α/(1−α)
(2.7)
Equation (2.6) above estimates the transitory dynamics of output per
effective worker in the neighbourhood of the steady-state level. Following
Dunne et al. (2005) , equation (2.6) is integrated forward from t − 1 to t,
giving:
ln ye(t) = e
z ln y(t− 1) + (1− ez) ln y∗e , z ≡ (α− 1)(n+ g + δ) (2.8)
Now, using equations (2.2), (2.7) and (2.8), ye is related to observable per
capita income (y = Y/L) via:
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}
+θ lnm(t)− ezθ lnm(t− 1) + (t− (t− 1)ez)g (2.9)
Where z is still equivalent to (α − 1)(n + g + δ), while θ is the elasticity
of steady-state income with respect to the long-run military expenditure
share. Equation (2.9) is conceptual and can be adapted to provide the basis
for empirical analysis, Dunne et al. (2005) suggest that the dynamic panel
specification can now be written in the form:






αk lnxk,i,t−1 + ηt + µi + νi,t
; i = 1, 2, ..., N ; t = 1, 2, ..., T (2.10)
where x1 = sK = the gross investment as a share of GDP; x2 = (ni,t+g+δ)
= labour force growth rate plus (g + δ) which is a constant, assumed to be
equal to 0.055; and x3 = mi,t which is equal to military spending as a share of
GDP. The variables xk represent the lagged variable of military spending and
gross investment as a share of GDP respectively. The variable ηt reflects the
time specific effects, µi represents group specific effects and νi,t is the error
term. Following from Islam (1995) this chapter treats s and n as variant
across countries and time, while taking g and δ to be uniform time-invariant
constants and exogenous across time and country.
5The assumption that (g + δ) = 0.05 follows from Mankiw et al. (1992); whereby they
chose values to match available data and this was supported by Romer (1990).
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2.4 Data Description
All the Solow-style regressions estimated here are based on the same bal-
anced panel data set. Starting with the military expenditure dataset of over
150 countries, provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute (SIPRI). Countries were excluded on the basis that a maximum of two
missing observations are allowed for the military expenditure variable. The
final balanced panel comprises of 106 countries with annual data spanning
the period 1988 to 2010. All the variables except for the trend term are in
natural log form, including lagged log values for military expenditure, capital
stock and real per capita GDP.
The two main variables of concern, real per capita GDP (growth) and
military expenditure as a share of GDP are obtained from World Bank and
SIPRI respectively. Unlike Islam (1995) or Yakovlev (2007) this chapter uses
annual data instead of five-year averages; the motivation being that busi-
ness cycle effects are important and form part of the long-run determinants
of growth. The variable gross-fixed capital formation as a share of GDP
is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
database and will be used as a measurement of capital stock. Due to diffi-
culties obtaining reliable data for the average growth rate of the working-age
population this chapter uses the common alternative of population growth
instead, this data is also from the World Bank’s WDI.
For the purposes of empirical analysis, indicator variables relating to the
specific sub-samples (e.g. income groups, developed and developing coun-
tries, conflict experience, natural resource abundance, net recipients of aid,
trade openness and political institutions) are used for sample stratifications.
The rationale behind using the sample stratification method and indicator
variables relate to the nature of the study as well as the type of sub-samples
considered. Many of the sub-samples considered (e.g. conflict experience, de-
veloped and developing and natural resource abundance) are invariant across
time and country and thus cannot be included in the growth regression as
categorical variables. Subsequently, the approach is to disaggregate the over-
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all sample into smaller sub-samples, which takes into consideration group
heterogeneity and non-linearity.
Classifications of countries that are either developed or developing and
income groupings are excerpted from the World Bank’s WDI database; de-
veloped countries are quoted a numerical value of one while all the remaining
countries within the sample receive a zero value.6 In order to homogenise the
sample size of the different income groups this chapter combines the defini-
tions of low and low-middle income countries to form low-income countries.
High-middle income countries are now defined as middle-income countries,
while the definition of high-income countries has been left unchanged.7 The
armed conflict indicator was taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gramme and International Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO)
database, which also differentiates between civil and interstate wars.8
Natural resource abundance, measured by mineral exports as a share of to-
tal exports, uses data from Haglund (2011) and the UNCTADstat database.
The focus was on six types of fuels and non-fuel minerals, as defined by the
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) codes shown in Table 2.2.
The natural resource indicator is divided into three sparate variables, with
each variable given a value of one or zero. The first variable (nat) charac-
terises whether a country is natural resource dependent via a combination
of fuel and non-fuel minerals; the second variable (fuel) indicates whether a
country is fuel dependent while the third variable (non−fuel) records coun-
tries that are non-fuel mineral dependent. A country is considered mineral
dependent if its mineral exports constitutes over 25% of total exports.
6Country classification for developed and non-developed are taken from the WB.
7Income group definitions are also from the WB, economies are divided according to
2010 gross national income (GNI) per capita. The groups are: low-income, $1005 or
less; lower-middle income, $1006 to $3975; upper-middle income, $3976-12 275; and high-
income, $12 276 or more.
8Armed conflict is a combination of either interstate of civil conflict. Interstate conflict
is defined as a conflict that occurs between two or more states, while conflict between the
government of a state and one or more internal opposition groups without intervention
from other states is labelled as a civil conflict. All conflict variables must satisfy the criteria
of having more than 25 battle-related deaths in a given year and over 1 000 battle-related
deaths since its onset.
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Table 2.2: Six Types of Mineral as Classified by SITC Codes
SITC code and description
SITC 27: Crude fertilizers and crude minerals
(excluding coal, petroleum and precious metals)
SITC 28: Metalliferous ores and metal scrap Non-fuel minerals
SITC 68: Non-ferrous metals
SITC 667: Pearls and semi-precious stones
SITC 971: Gold, non-monetary
SITC 3: Mineral fuels (including natural gas), Fuel
lubricants and related materials.
Official development assistance (ODA) or aid is taken from the WB WDI.
The full sample of countries is initially divided into those that are net ODA
recipients compared to those that are not. Since net recipients of aid is
measured as a share of GNI, any country that receives on average less than
0.1% of aid as a share of GNI will be considered as non-aid recipients. Aid
recipients are then divided further into countries that receive low (less than
1% of GNI), medium (between 1 and 5% of GNI) and high (greater than 3%
of GNI) amounts of aid.
Measures of political institutions uses the polity variable extracted from
the Polity IV database with the variable ranging from -10 (high autocracy)
to 10 (high democracy). To create an indicator variable consistent with the
others, a polity value of less than -3 will be categorised as an autocratic state,
values between -3 and 3 (inclusive) will be labelled as an intermediate states,
while values of greater than 3 will be seen as a democratic state. Finally,
the trade openness variable (trade) takes on a value of one for open and zero
for closed economies. The imports, exports and GDP figures are recorded
on constant US dollars, averaged over the entire 23-year period and deflated
using purchasing power parity.
Table 2.3 below provides the summary statistics of the final dataset con-
taining 106 countries over a 23-year period. The sample includes 28 devel-
oped countries, 78 developing countries, 30 African countries, 20 Asian and
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Oceania countries, 26 European countries, 21 North and South American
countries and 9 Middle East countries.9 In the full sample, 37 percent of
all countries have experienced some form of conflict (civil or interstate) be-
tween 1988 and 2010. Similarly, 63 percent of the countries receive ODA,
almost 36 percent are natural resource dependent and just over 78 percent
are considered open economies.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Variable Description Mean Std Dev.
m Military Spending as % of GDP 2.70 3.71
y Real GDP per capita 11964 12658
k Gross fixed capital formation % of GDP 21.28 6.57
pop Population (in 000’s) 50408 156627
∆y Growth in Real GDP per capita (%) 1.96 4.78
∆m Growth in Military Spending (%) -2.20 20.58
∆k Growth in Gross fixed capital formation (%) 0.13 14.84
Conflict Conflict prevalence 0.37 0.48
Polity Polity IV (-10 to 10) 2.48 0.76
Aid Countries Receiving ODA (%) 63.2 48.2
Nat Abundance in Natural Resources (%) 35.8 47.9
Trade Open Economies (%) 78.3 41.2
2.5 Empirical Analysis
In undertaking the empirical analysis of military spending and growth, a
major problem has been poor data quality and a lack of exogenous variation
within the data. However, since the end of the cold war, data quality and
leverage have improved and developments in panel data techniques has helped
overcome the limited exogenous variation in the data (Dunne et al., 2005).
Panel data methods such as simple fixed effects, random effects and random
9A list of countries featured in the chapter can be found in the appendix. Table A1
shows the full list of 106 countries, while tables A2, A3 and A4 display countries in the
stratified sub-samples.
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coefficient estimators have all been increasingly used. Moreover, as longer
time-series become available, dynamic specifications have been introduced
into panel data techniques. This, however, has raised a number of issues, as
the following example of a simple bivariate dynamic model demonstrates:
yit = αi + βxjt−1 + λyjt−1 + uit (2.11)
as equation (2.11) shows, a fixed effects estimator would suffer from lagged
dependent variable (yit−1) bias, which will bias the OLS estimator (β) down-
wards. Apart from the lagged dependent variable bias, there is also a case
for heterogeneity bias when the parameters differ over the groups. This re-
sultant heterogeneity bias will bias the estimates of λ upwards. Ways to
deal with this potential heterogeneity bias include estimating each equation
individually and then taking an average of the individual estimates or using
a dynamic model with fixed effects. Another solution is to use a dynamic
panel with fixed effects. The long-run estimates of the military spending are
likely to be less biased since the estimates of β (downwards) and λ (upwards)
work in opposite directions in cancelling out its respective individual effects
(Dunne et al., 2002). The estimated general first-order dynamic model will
then take the form of:






αk lnxk,i,t−1 + ηt + µi + νi,t
; i = 1, 2, ..., N ; t = 1, 2, ..., T (2.12)
where y is GDP per capita, x1 is gross fixed capital formation as a share
of GDP (proxy for investment or capital stock), x2 is military spending as
a share of GDP, x3 is the population growth rate plus 0.05 or (n + g + d).
The re-parameterised general first-order dynamic model is then estimated
and the results are presented in Table 2.4, where all variables are in logs (l),
∆ represents the change in the variable, (t− 1) denotes a lag of one period,
the dependent variable in all regressions is ∆ly and representing the change
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in per capita GDP.
The results show a very well defined empirical model, with all the tra-
ditional growth variables statistically significant and of the expected signs,
a finding that is consistent with Mankiw et al. (1992)’s predictions. The
change in log of capital or gross investment (∆lk) is positive and significant;
indicating that for the full sample of countries, the higher the investment,
the richer the country. The variable log of population growth rate + 0.05
(lngd) is negative and significant, pointing towards higher rates of population
growth having a negative impact on a country’s economy. The lagged level
value of per capita GDP (ly1 ) is negative and significant, this, as expected, is
the standard result in the empirical growth literature, known as conditional
convergence. Moving onto the variable of concern, military expenditure as a
share of GDP has a clear negative relationship (in the short and long run)
with per capita economic growth. A result which is consistent with recent
cross-country studies (Dunne and Tian, 2013).10
Considering possible heterogeneity in the sample, Table 2.4 also pro-
vides estimation results for developed and developing countries, giving results
which are similar to the full sample. In the non-developed country group,
there is a negative and significant relation between military expenditure and
economic growth in the short and long-run, while for the developed coun-
tries this effect is only seen in the short-run with no visible evidence in the
long-run. Interestingly, there is also a major difference in the size of the co-
efficients between developed and developing country groups. The coefficients
of military spending in Table 2.4 suggest that defence spending in develop-
ing countries are substantially more harmful, about 50 percent, compared to
developed countries. The long-run coefficients seems to support this obser-
vation with the effect for non-developed countries more than doubling that
of the developed countries.11
10For robustness checks a robust standard error using the Huber/White estimator was
used. The significance of the explanatory variables remain unchanged and thus this chapter
reports only the normal standard errors in all remaining tables.
11The long-run coefficient is calculated according to a general error correction model in
the form of ∆yt = β0 + β1∆xt + β2xt−1 +α1yt−1 + εt where in a steady state equilibrium
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Table 2.4: Growth Effects of Military Expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
Sample All Developed Non-Developed
Variables ∆ly ∆ly ∆ly
∆lk 0.070** 0.213** 0.059**
(0.006) (0.014) (0.007)
∆lm -0.027** -0.018** -0.027**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
lngdpop -0.056** -0.093** -0.046**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
ly1 -0.089** -0.044** -0.091**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
lk1 0.030** 0.023** 0.026**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
lm1 -0.017** -0.009 -0.018**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Constant -3.406** -0.044 -4.459**
(0.398) (0.587) (0.497)
Trend Yes Yes Yes
LR Coefficient -0.191 -0.097 -0.198
Observations 2148 607 1557
R-squared 0.140 0.375 0.143
Dependent variable: ∆ly; Standard errors in parenthese; Significance levels:
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1; All standard errors reported are the normal
standard errors.
As Dunne (2012) and Pieroni (2009) argue, the effect of military expendi-
ture on growth may well be very different for countries with different income
levels, suggesting a non-linear relation. To consider such differences, the full
sample is stratified into three different income groups of low, medium and
high income, giving the results in Table 2.5. Once again, the empirical growth
∆yt,∆xt, εt, β0 = 0, giving a long-run coefficient in a function of − β2α1 .
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model is generally well specified across the income groups, with coefficients of
the expected sign. For all three income groups, the effect of military burden
on growth is negative and significant in the short-run, but in the long-run
this pattern is only evident in the low and high-income countries.12
Table 2.5: Growth Effects of Military Expenditure, Stratifying for Income
(1) (2) (3)
Sample Low Medium High
Variables ∆ly ∆ly ∆ly
∆lk 0.003 0.163** 0.112**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
∆lm -0.034** -0.019* -0.025**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
lngdpop -0.026** -0.021 -0.083**
(0.015) (0.022) (0.010)
ly1 -0.093** -0.092** -0.082**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
lk1 0.014† 0.043** 0.021*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
lm1 -0.027** -0.005 -0.020**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant -4.555** -5.476** -0.609
(0.673) (0.790) (0.635)
Trend Yes Yes Yes
LR Coefficient -0.290 -0.054 -0.244
Observations 831 638 695
R-squared 0.128 0.346 0.257
Dependent variable: ∆ly; Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1
12The difference in sample size of 88 between the high-income and developed countries
are due to countries labelled as high income in terms of per capita GNI but not developed.
These 5 countries are Bahrain, Hungary, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
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This is an interesting result suggesting that medium income countries
might have a particular set of characteristics setting them apart from high
and low-income countries. Thus creating a scenario whereby defence spend-
ing does not have as severe an opportunity cost. This might be due to per-
sistent experiences of conflict in low income countries, particularly in Africa,
or the need to allocate large amounts of resources to welfare schemes in high
income countries, cases which are uncommon in medium income countries.
A detailed look at the subgroups shows middle-income countries have the
highest growth rates and lowest military burden, which potentially leads to
systematically different displacement effects of military expenditure. In com-
paring the coefficients of military spending, the result matches the findings
in Table 2.4. Poorer countries seem to have more to lose from military ex-
penditures than richer, more developed countries.
Previous studies on Africa have found differences in the military spending
growth relation for countries in conflict and those that are not (Smaldone,
2006). However, the results here of a worldwide sample do not support
this. Breaking the full sample into groups of countries that have experienced
conflict (39 countries) and those that have not (67 countries) gave the results
in Table 2.6. Irrespective of whether a country has experienced conflict,
military expenditure has a negative effect on economic growth in both the
short and long-run. It is also possible that the type of conflict may be
more relevant, since conditions associated to civil conflict may be completely
contrasting to that of an interstate conflict.13 Thus, Table 2.6 also reports
results for countries that have experienced civil or interstate conflicts.14
The estimation results for countries with civil war experiences (Column
3, Table 5) are consistent with the overall sample, conflict and no conflict
groups, with significant negative short and long-run effects of military bur-
13Civil conflicts are known to last longer than interstate conflicts. Research by the likes
of Fearon (2004) have suggested civil wars to be lasting longer decade by decade and
hence may lead to implications on the amount of military spending being spent, which
could have direct impacts on an economy.
14Over the 23 year period, the 6 countries that have experienced both civil and interstate
conflict are: Ethiopia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Peru and United Kingdom
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den on economic development. Intriguingly, military burden on countries
involved in interstate conflicts seem to have no effect on growth. This might
be due to the various distinctions between civil and interstate wars as dis-
cussed in Lemke and Cunningham (2009). The consequences of military
spending on economic growth would be different for a country that is in-
vaded than a country which fights in an another country or participates in
large multilateral operations.
Table 2.6: Growth Effects of Military Expenditure, Stratifying for Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Conflict No Conflict Civil Interstate
Variables ∆ly ∆ly ∆ly ∆ly
∆lk 0.045** 0.087** 0.046** 0.144**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.023)
∆lm -0.028** -0.025** -0.027** -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
lngdpop -0.036** -0.075** -0.029* -0.151**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.040)
ly1 -0.118** -0.067** -0.107** -0.124**
(0.013) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024)
lk1 0.030** 0.029** 0.029* 0.067**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.019)
lm1 -0.021** -0.018** -0.019** -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant -5.897** -1.450** -5.998** -5.112**
(0.606) (0.550) (0.678) (1.073)
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
LR Coefficient -0.178 -0.269 -0.178 -0.048
Observations 775 1389 695 228
R-squared 0.193 0.138 0.257 0.355
Dependent variable: ∆ly; Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1
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While military expenditure may have a universal negative effect on growth
for both conflict and non-conflict countries, there could be a different effect
on countries at different income levels. To do this, the next step investigates
the 38 countries that have experienced conflict, grouping into low, medium
and high income countries. These results can be found in Table A5 in the
appendix, but due to lack of observations for medium and high-income groups
the results should be analysed with caution. Although defence spending
remain negative and significant for low and high-income conflict afflicted
countries, medium income countries continue to show insignificant effects,
irrespective of conflict experience. A comparison of the coefficients in Tables
2.6 and A5 show that for high income countries the military burden is more
than three times larger than that of the conflict affected low-income countries
and which in turn are both larger than the overall conflict and civil war group.
This suggests that while military spending is marginally more harmful for
countries in conflict as compared to not in conflict, its damaging effect is
even greater for low-income countries involved in conflict and greatest in
high-income conflict affected countries.
Given the potential for various other heterogeneous effects in the sample,
possible differences in natural resource abundance, net aid received, trade
openness and political institutions are explored. These results are given in a
summary table below (Table 2.7). Since the coefficients of the general Solow
control variables remained consistent throughout the different stratifications,
only the coefficient of interest, military spending in the short and long-run,
are reported.
To consider the possible impact of natural resource dependence, the UNC-
TADstat database was used to divide the full sample into 38 countries that
are resource dependent and 68 countries that are not resource dependent.
Table 2.7 shows military burden to have a negative and significant short
and long-run effect on growth for both countries with or without natural re-
sources. An interesting outcome of the natural resource stratification shows
the size of the military spending coefficients to be substantially larger for
the no natural resource group as compared to the resource abundant group.
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The initial rationale for splitting the sample according to natural resource
abundance was to assess the hypothesis that resource rich countries spend
on average more on military than non-resource rich countries.15
Estimates of the mean show that resource rich countries allocate on aver-
age 3.6 percent of their GDP to military expenditure, while non-resource rich
countries spend only 2.2 percent of the GDP on the military. This 1.4 per-
cent is statistically significant. While on average natural resource abundant
countries spend more on the military than non-natural resource abundant
countries, the negative effect as illustrated in Table 2.7 is less for the re-
source abundant countries. There are various reasonable explanations for
this result. One can think of resource abundance potentially making mil-
itary burden more affordable or that, indirectly, a secure natural resource
sector through military protection is less harmful to the economy than one
that is constantly being fought over.
Allowing for differences in the type of natural resource, the resource abun-
dant group is divided into those that are resource rich in fuel and those rich
in non-fuel minerals, with estimates showing a clear distinction. While the
results for the fuel resource rich countries are consistent with the overall
regressions, military expenditure for non-fuel resource rich countries is es-
timated to have no effect on growth in the short or long-run. This would
suggest that oil economies are driving the negative effects of military burden
in the estimates of natural resource abundant countries.
Moving to consider the possible impact of aid, Table 2.7 also illustrates
results for countries that receive aid and those that do not, while further
stratifying the ODA recipients into low, medium and high aid groups. Again,
the results suggest defence expenditure having a negative and significant
short and long-run effect, irrespective of whether a country receives foreign
development aid. Although this holds true for countries receiving medium
and high levels of aid, no such effect is seen for those receiving low levels
of aid. Furthermore, the negative coefficients of military burden in the short
15Military spending can be seen as a way to help the incumbent leader maintain control
the resource rich areas and continue to extract rents.
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and long-run increase in size as a country receives higher levels of aid. This
may be indicative of poorer countries receiving the most aid often having
more to lose when government allocates resources to the military instead of
development. Moreover, it could also suggest a potential for indiscretionary
spending as a result of receiving large amounts development assistance.
Table 2.7: Summary Results for Military Burden on Economic Growth
(1) (2) (3)
Variables ∆lm lm1 LR Coefficient
Natural Resource -0.021** -0.011* -0.083
No Resource -0.028** -0.021** -0.328
Fuel -0.044** -0.029** -0.269
Non-Fuel -0.001 -0.002 -0.013
Aid -0.028** -0.018** -0.170
No Aid -0.023** -0.016* -0.246
Low Aid -0.001 -0.010† -0.111
Medium Aid -0.031** -0.022** -0.186
High Aid -0.035** -0.032** -0.337
Open -0.033** -0.024** -0.233
Closed -0.013 -0.008 -0.129
Autocratic -0.027† -0.008 -0.114
Intermediate -0.052** -0.041** -0.318
Democratic -0.012* -0.008* -0.113
Dependent variable: ∆ly; Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1
In trying to understand why military expenditure has no adverse effect on
low aid recipient countries, the sample was disaggregated by income group.
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Of the 18 countries that received low levels of aid, 13 were medium income
countries, a group that has been consistently found in this chapter to have
no adverse military burden effects. Unsurprisingly, such a high proportion
of medium income countries in the low-aid recipient group would no doubt
push military spending to be insignificant.
Another potential source of heterogeneity is trade openness.16 Given
that the majority of countries in the world are net arms importers, a more
open economy could represent a larger share of arms imports than closed
economies, leading to greater opportunity costs on development. Compar-
ing mean estimates of military burden for open (2.77 percent of GDP) and
closed (2.45 percent of GDP) economies show that indeed countries which
trade more spend more on the military, a difference that is statistically sig-
nificant. The estimation results in Table 2.7 exemplify military burden to
have a striking difference between open and closed economies. While for open
economies arms expenditure is found to have a negative and significant short
and long-run effect on growth, no such effects are seen for closed economies.
These differences are further supported when the average openness measure
is replaced with year specific measures of openness (i.e year 2000 or 2010).17
Finally, the impact of political institutions are considered. The coefficient
estimates in Table 2.7 provide valuable insight on the importance political in-
stitutions have on military burden. Although, as expected, military spending
as a share of GDP is greatest in autocratic states (4.76 percent of GDP) as
compared to intermediate (2.61 percent of GDP) or democratic (2.21 percent
of GDP) states, its impact on growth is not significant. Interestingly, this
chapter finds military expenditure to only have a negative and significant
growth effect on intermediate and democratic states, with a substantially
large adverse effect estimated for the intermediate group.
16Since one might expect nature of military spending to be entirely different for a country
that is a net arms exporter compared to a net arms importer, stratification according to
arms importers and exporters were considered as an alternative. However, of the 106
country sample only nine were classified as net arms exporters, thus providing insufficient
observations for any meaningful regression analysis.
17See appendix Table A6 for full estimation results
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How might this result be explained? For autocratic states, political and
economic stability is maintained through military force. Military spending,
while an opportunity cost, may be seen as necessary in order preserve political
power, order and some form economic development. On opposite end of the
spectrum, democratic states do not need the military to keep political and
economic power. In this case, military expenditure for democratic states
contains a greater opportunity cost than autocratic states, hence the negative
and significant coefficients seen in Table 2.7. As for intermediate states,
closer analysis suggests this group to have the most volatile economy and
political situation, the lowest growth rates, receive the most amount of ODA
and has the highest proportion of countries with a history of violent conflict
(62 percent of all intermediate states in the sample have experienced some
form of violent conflict). Countries which are most prone to conflict and
have the most precarious political and economic situations may indeed have
the most to lose in terms of reallocating resources away from development
and towards the military, a result which is reflected in the regressions. This
negative impact of military spending (short and long-run) is also the largest
compared to all the other estimations.
2.6 Conclusion
Military expenditure by governments is indeed important in the influence
it has, especially when it leads to or facilitates conflict. As a result, the
economic impact of such spending is of great concern. In this chapter, the
link between military expenditure and economic growth is explored. Using
a comprehensive post-cold war balanced panel data set for the period 1988
to 2010, a modelling framework suggested by Dunne et al. (2005) and sam-
ple stratification, concerns of heterogeneity and non-linearity are considered.
The estimation results using a dynamic panel approach with fixed effects
provide strong support for the negative impact of military burden on growth
in both the short and long-run.
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When the overall sample was stratified into different sub-groups, it pro-
vided valuable insight into the relationship between military expenditure and
economic growth. Grouping countries into developed and developing gave
results similar to the overall group, only the long-run effect for developed
countries was insignificant. Consistent results were observed when countries
were broken into the three income groups, with the short-run coefficient esti-
mate negative and significant for all three groups and the long-run estimate
negative and significant for the low and high-income groups. A compari-
son across the different income and development sub-samples suggests that
military spending, while harmful to growth, is particularly more harmful to
poorer and less developed countries than richer countries.
While the relationship between military spending and growth for conflict
and non-conflict affected countries were negative and significant, expected
differences in the effects of military burden on growth in civil and interstate
wars was quite apparent. When the type of conflict was considered only the
civil conflict group showed any negative and significant results. Other group
stratifications by natural resource abundance, net aid received, trade open-
ness and political institutions were considered, giving generally consistent
negative and significant results, but also with specific sub-samples showing
no effects.
The results in this chapter provide a comprehensive overview on the im-
portance of sample heterogeneity and non-linearity. It seems as though in a
post-cold war setting, a consensus is developing whereby military spending is
estimated to have an adverse effect on economic growth. While a compelling
conclusion can be drawn across countries, care is needed in applying this
finding to individual countries as some country groupings showed differing
results. Countries characterised as being either middle income, non-fuel nat-
ural resource abundant, low-aid recipients, closed economies, autocratic or
democratic showed military expenditure as having no significant burden on
the economy. As a final note, the most striking aspect of this chapter is that
across all the country groups investigated, there were no evidence of military
expenditure having any positive and significant growth effects.
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CHAPTER 3
Conflict, Economic Growth and Spillover Effects in Africa
3.1 Introduction
Conflict has been a common and persistent phenomenon in recent history,
afflicting between 30 and 50% of all nations, depending on which definition is
used and lasting longer decade-by-decade1. These conflicts and its associated
costs can be considered to have a disproportionate effect on poorer countries.
As historical evidence suggests, the poorest countries in urgent need of eco-
nomic development are often the ones embroiled in violent fighting and to
devastating effects (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). In Africa, the world’s poor-
est continent, more than 80% of countries have been embroiled in some form
of violent conflict since 1960, with 30% having experienced at least ten years
of conflict during this period. These wars range from mild skirmishes in coun-
tries such as Burkina Faso to large scale battles and massacres in the likes
1Conflicts that count more than 1 000 battle deaths and those that count at least
twenty-five battle deaths.
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of Rwanda and Sudan. In Rwanda, for example, over 20% of the population
moved into poverty following the genocide (Justino and Verwimp, 2006). An
even worse case was observed in Sudan. Labelled as one of the longest and
deadliest civil wars, the conflict between Sudan’s North and South led to
over 2 million deaths, 5 million being displaced and hundreds of thousands
abducted and subjected to slavery (Deng, 2001). Collier et al. (2003) argue
that these disproportionate and destructive effects may be so great that it
could account for the income gap between the world’s richest and poorest
countries. Thus, this makes understanding the costs of conflict an important
developmental concern.
Although a large literature has been developed in order to understand
what leads to conflict (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin,
2003), there have been relatively few attempts to try and evaluate its costs
and even fewer to consider the impact of conflict on economic growth (Dunne,
2013). More recently, there has been a recognition that the effects of conflict
can range further than the host nation and affect neighbour countries (Sale-
hyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Black, 2013; Bosker and Ree, 2014). A literature
has since developed to look at these conflict spillovers with de Groot (2010)
following the work of Murdoch and Sandler (2002b,a, 2004) and coming to
some different conclusions.
This move to assess conflict spillovers is important but it has been limited
to using geographic distance as a spillover measurement. Instead, spatial
econometric studies should consider other factors of distance such as political
and economic similarities (Beck et al., 2006). The potential importance of
similarities and differences in these factors to determine the impact of one
country’s conflict on another has been considered in the literature on the
determinants of conflict, but not in the cost of conflict. Just like Watts
and Strogatz (1998)’s argument that two distinct people may be “close” in
that they share a common acquaintance, countrys that are far away may be
“close” if they share a common economic, political or cultural traits.
This chapter contributes to the literature by analysing the spillover effects
of conflict in Africa for the period 1960 to 2010 and develops a measure of dis-
43
tance to account for not simply geographic distance, but also political and
economic characteristics. The next section considers the literature on the
spillover effects of conflict and suggests an extension to the existing studies
which may yield more realistic results. Section three then presents the the-
oretical framework and the construction of the distance matrices. The data
set and empirical method are described in section four, while the estimation
results can be found in section five. The sixth and final section provides some
conclusions.
3.2 Spillover Effects of Conflict
While there is a substantial literature on the economics of civil conflict,
the majority of this has been focused on the determinants and duration of
civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2004; Fearon, 2004). A
more limited literature has considered the economic effects of conflict, with
a number of studies evaluating the costs of conflict Dunne (2013). In most
cases, these studies have focused on the economic effects of the country in
which the conflict is taking place (see Collier (1999) and Gyimah-Brempong
and Corley (2005)). Given that it is highly unlikely for the consequences of
armed conflict to be restricted to the host nation, it is surprising that only
a small number of studies such as Murdoch and Sandler (2002a,b, 2004) and
de Groot (2010) have tried to consider its wider economic effects.
It was Murdoch and Sandler (2002a) who initially took the important
step in recognising the likely significance of spillover effects on neighbouring
countries, considering directly contiguous countries (e.g. those sharing a
border with the host nation). Using a basic Solow growth model and adding
domestic and adjacent conflicts, they found that for a worldwide sample of
84 countries during the period 1960 to 1990, civil wars had a significant
negative influence on the steady-state level of GDP per capita for both the
conflict afflicted country and its neighbours. Moreover, they note that while
part of the negative civil war effect works on growth through the classical
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channels of capital and labour, the largest effect is found to come through
the unobserved, country specific, channel.
In two subsequent papers, Murdoch and Sandler (2002a, 2004) develops
their initial work, varying in time periods, country samples and the defini-
tion of contiguity. Using the Gleditsch and Ward (2001) minimum distance
between nations dataset, they constructed matrices to measure whether a
country is within a specific distance of nearest approach. In their (2002b)
paper, for a worldwide sample, Murdoch and Sandler find that the effects
of civil conflict is felt over a distance of 800 km, but their (2004) analysis
on continental heterogeneity concludes that different regions have different
minimum distances. Civil conflicts in Africa had the shortest spillover dis-
tance of 100 km, whilst in Latin America and Asia an episode of conflict can
have a spillover distance of 300 and 500 km, respectively. In all three papers
the long-run effects of civil war were insignificant, which they attribute to
Organski and Kugler (1980)’s phoenix effect, while in the short-run civil wars
were were found to have a negative and significant growth effect on both the
host and neighbouring countries.2
Following from Murdoch and Sandler’s initial contributions, de Groot
(2010) develops the analysis by proposing a change to the estimation pro-
cess. Firstly he argues that Murdoch and Sandler’s theoretical model re-
stricts spillover effects to be uni-dimensional and thus lacks the flexibility to
estimate a “bounce back” effect that exists between contiguous states.3 Dis-
tinguishing between primary neighbours (contiguous states) and secondary
neighbours (non-contiguous states) within a set distance threshold will allow
for both uni and multi-dimensional spillover effects to be captured. Secondly,
by replacing the dummy variable for contiguity with the actual minimum dis-
2The phoenix effect is named after the metaphor of a phoenix rising from the ashes,
symbolising that for a post-conflict society, their GDP per capita may be at such a low
base that they are able to rebound quickly and reach their steady-state growth path. This
follows the same link as Barro and Sala-i Martin (1992) conditional convergence theorem.
3This “bounce back” effect describes the ability for the spillover effects to flow back
and forth from the host country and its neighbours. This is unlike Murdoch and Sandler’s
work where they assume the spillover to only flow from the conflict afflicted country to
their neighbours.
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tance between countries it gave a more satisfactory and continuous measure
of spillover. Using data for Africa from the period 1960 to 2000, de Groot
finds that the distinction between primary and secondary neighbours led to
very different conclusions. Rather than the general negative growth effect
from conflict on all neighbours, de Groot suggests that there could poten-
tially be a growth trade-off that benefits countries close to the conflict and
not contiguous (e.g. secondary neighbours), but punishes those that are di-
rectly contiguous (e.g. primary neighbours). In addition, whereas previous
work focused on civil wars, de Groot considered all forms of conflict and
found the results to be consistent.
While the contribution of de Groot (2010) adds further refinement to the
literature, a number of developments suggest that this issue is worth revis-
iting. Firstly, more data has become available, both in terms of quality and
quantity. Secondly, the use of five-year averages in all of the above mentioned
studies is questioned, as it does not allow conflicts that last one year to be
distinguished from ones lasting more than one year and cannot pick up more
than one episode of conflict during a five year period. Thirdly, the political
science literature has raised the issue of whether physical distance measures
are adequate in assessing spillover effects. Conley and Ligon (2002) uses dif-
ferent transportation costs (e.g. UPS shipping costs and airfare) to show that
cross-country growth spillovers are more noticeable than simply using geo-
graphical distance, while Beck et al. (2006) suggest that spatial econometric
work in political economy must consider not only geographical distance but
also political and economic distances, such as trade or democracy.
In the case of Africa, a region with numerous political, economic and his-
toric similarities (e.g. type of ruler, colonialism, natural resource abundance
and trade) and one that has been plagued with long-lasting conflicts, this
seems a particularly important issue. Thus, in light of the identified short-
comings in the literature and innovations from other literatures, this chapter
represents an opportunity to fill the current research gap by updating the
data set, using annual observations and estimating conflict spillovers using
not only geographic distance, but also political and economic distance.
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3.3 Theoretical Framework
Following previous studies, the basic theoretical model used to estimate the
effects of a conflict on economic growth is based on the classic Solow (1956)
model, augmented to include human capital (Mankiw et al., 1992). This
model features a Cobb-Douglas production function for diminishing returns
(e.g. decreasing marginal product) in labour (L), physical (K) and human
capital (H). Constant returns to scale characterises the production function
so that proportional increases in inputs leads to proportional increases in
output, while along the steady state growth path, savings equals investment
in physical and human capital. In order to determine the empirical effects of
conflict on economic growth, the model is further augmented to include con-
flict experience within home and neighbouring countries, via the technology
parameter (A). The human capital augmented production function featuring
a Harrod-neutral technical progress can be written as:
Y (t) = K(t)αH(t)β[A(t)L(t)]1−α−β, 0 < α + β < 1 (3.1)
where α and β are the elasticities of output with respect to physical and
human capital respectively. Y (t) denotes output at time t, K(t) is physical
capital, H(t) is stock of human capital and A(t) is the technology parameter
with output elasticity of (1 − α − β). Labour is assumed to grow at an
exogenous growth rate of n, technical progress will grow at the exogenous
rate of g and both physical and human capital will depreciate at the identical
rate δ. By dividing both sides of equation (3.1) by effective labour (AL), it
gives an expression in terms of income per effective worker (y = Y/AL), that
equals:
y(t) = k(t)αh(t)β (3.2)
with k = K/AL and h = H/AL in quantities per effective worker at time
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t. The model is solved by determining the transition equations of k and
h, solving for the steady-state levels of k, h and y and log-linearising (see
Mankiw et al. (1992) for a full derivation). This gives a model that can be
empirically parameterised as the following:
y(t) = β0 + β1 ln(y0) + β2 ln(sk) + β3 ln(sh) + β4 ln(n+ g + δ) (3.3)
where y(t) is the growth rate of income per capita at time t, ln denotes
the natural logarithm, y0 is the initial income level of income per capita, sk
is the investment in physical capital, sh is the level human capital, n is the
growth rate of population, g is the growth rate of technical progress and δ is
the rate of depreciation.
Theoretically, growth in per capita income from the augmented Solow
model, shown in equation (3.3), depends positively on investment in physical
and human capital, but falls with increases in (n + g + δ) or higher initial
levels of income per capita (y0).
4 An increase in the natural rate of labour
growth (n) or labour efficiency (g) raises the denominator of the dependent
variable (i.e. income per capita) and thus reducing its level. Similarly, depre-
ciation limits income growth through reductions in the growth of physical and
human capital as this decline must be offset overtime by a positive accumula-
tion. If the initial level or previous period’s income per capita has a negative
influence on economic growth, this implies that countries with a lower GDP,
ceteris paribus, will growth faster suggesting conditional convergence (Barro,
1991). Poorer countries with low ratios of physical and human capital have
higher marginal products with their respective capital as compared to richer
countries and thereby grow at higher rates. In line with historical literature,
the theory of convergence has been crucial in investigating the impact of con-
flict on economic growth. Following a conflict, a country can be considered
as starting from a relatively low level of income per capita, whereby it then
4y0 denotes initial income, but in annual data, this also represents income in the pre-
vious period (e.g. a lagged dependent variable).
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catches up through convergence. Organski and Kugler (1980) labelled this
the “Phoenix” effect as countries decimated by war rise up from the ashes
to record substantial growth rates in the post-conflict years.
There are other ways in which conflict can influence growth, especially
when considering the influence of neighbouring country conflicts on eco-
nomic growth. In defining the different effects resulting from armed con-
flict, this chapter follows from de Groot (2010) and divides countries in
three types: host nations, primary or directly contiguous neighbours, and
secondary neighbours or nations that are near a conflict but not directly
contiguous to it.
Conflict can influence home and neighbouring country growth through
five theoretical channels with its effects summarised in Table 3.1. The first
is through the destruction of capital. This destruction of physical capital
mainly applies to host nations and through collateral damage on primary
neighbours, with secondary neighbours likely to suffer little to no collateral
damage. This implies that the further a country is from the conflict origin,
the lower the negative influence it has, with a potential to have no effect.
Conflict may also affect foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing to the region
due to higher perceived risk, which will negatively affect host nations and
primary neighbours. The influence it has on secondary neighbours is debated
since apart from the potential decrease in investment, the increase of per-
ceived risk in conflict afflicted nations and primary neighbours could lead to
relatively more attractive investment opportunities appearing in secondary
neighbours.
The second channel is labour and human capital, with its largest effect
likely to be destruction and displacement of productive labour and the re-
assignment of labour to less productive activities (e.g. border patrols, man-
agement of refugees or soldiering). Mirroring the capital channel, primary
neighbours may to an extent experience the same negative impact as host
nations. An addition to these effects is the influence of refugees from the
conflict region, with primary neighbours bearing the bulk of refugee inflows.
This is likely to be costly, reducing their income per capita in the short run.
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In the long run, the effect is unclear, as a portion of the negative effect can
be cancelled out by the positive inflow of human and physical capital some
refugees bring, but also a worsening through conflict diffusion (Salehyan and
Gleditsch, 2006).5 On the other hand, secondary neighbours are less likely
to be affected and when they are, it is possible that those refugees who are
able to cross multiple borders carry higher capital than usual, which can be
actually be beneficial.
Channel three is trade. In a host country afflicted with conflict, both do-
mestic and international trade is likely to be negatively affected, which can
directly harm economic growth. This could have a substantial effect on pri-
mary neighbours since diversion of trade flows with the host country will also
curb economic growth. However, primary neighbours can negate part of the
negative effect by choosing to substitute or redirect trade to the host coun-
tries secondary neighbours or their primary neighbours. Conflict may have
a large regional affect on trade, which also harms secondary neighbours, but
the redirection of primary neighbour trade could provide new trade oppor-
tunities for secondary neighbours, which can increase their economic growth
(de Groot, 2010).
A fourth channel is the reallocation of resources to less productive ac-
tivities. This can include efforts to quell local conflicts or bolster defence
spending in order to defend territorial borders. In the case of increased de-
fence spending, resources must be diverted from productive activities and
will have an opportunity cost on economic growth (Dunne and Tian, 2015).
For the host nation and primary neighbours, activities such as border patrols,
deployment of personnel and resources to manage the inflow of refugees have
a clear cost, but there is little rationale to assume that secondary neighbours
would also have to reallocate resources away from productive activities.6 The
final channel through which conflict distorts economic growth is the potential
5Refugees may facilitate in the transnational movement of arms, combatants and ide-
ologies that may be conducive to civil conflict.
6An exception to this case would be if the host country, primary and secondary neigh-
bours are part of a security web. While this case is interesting, it is beyond the scope of
this chapter and would rather provide an interesting avenue for future research.
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spillover effect of conflict itself (Sambanis, 2002). This can be significant for
primary neighbours, particularly if they end up getting dragged into host na-
tions conflicts, but the effect on secondary neighbours is likely to be minimal
(Bosker and Ree, 2014).
Table 3.1: Effects of Conflict on Types of Countries and its Spillover Channels
Spillover Channels Host Nation Pri. Neighbour Sec. Neigbour
P. Capital -ve effect -ve effect -ve, no effect, +ve
Labour & H. Capital -ve effect -ve, no effect -ve, no effect, +ve
Trade -ve effect -ve, no effect -ve, no effect, +ve
Resource Allocation -ve effect -ve effect no effect
Conflict -ve effect -ve, no effect -ve, no effect
Notes: P = Physical; H = Human; -ve = negative; +ve = positive
While it is obvious that the host country is likely to experience a negative
growth shock as a result of conflict, the impact on primary and secondary
neighbours can be considered different. Primary neighbours are expected to
experience either negative or no growth shock from a host country’s conflict,
while secondary neighbours can be deliberated to suffer limited or no draw-
backs from a host country’s conflict and potentially reap certain spillover
benefits. Given that the spillover effects vary depending on the channel and
type of country, the overall effect can only be determined empirically. To
augment the growth model for this purpose, variables are introduced to cap-
ture host country conflict and primary and secondary neighbour conflicts,
which is in-turn weighted to reflect distance. The growth equation which
includes the different types of distance contiguity matrices can be written as:
∆ ln y = α0 + β1 ln(y0,i) + β2 ln(sk,i,t) + β3 ln(sh,i,t) + β4 ln(n+ g + δ)
+β5(confi,t) + β6Wpri(confpri,i,t) + β7Wsec(confsec,i,t) + εi,t (3.4)
where conf is a measure of conflict experience, while Wpri and Wsec are
weighted contiguity matrices of primary and secondary contiguity respec-
tively.
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Although most work within the conflict literature has made a clear dis-
tinction between civil and interstate conflict, Gleditsch (2007) makes a com-
pelling argument that such events are at times not distinctively different,
particularly when looking at spillover costs, thus both civil and interstate
conflicts are considered. Keeping with the literature, a host country conflict
is recorded as a dummy variable and primary neighbour contiguity matri-
ces are constructed using two approaches. Firstly, using a dummy variable
approach, a value of 1 is given to countries sharing a border with the host na-
tion and 0 otherwise. Additionally, a border length approach is implemented,
where border distance between countries is used as a matrix element. For
primary neighbour weights, the dummy variable and border length are di-
vided by the sum of all primary neighbours and the total distance of the
host country’s border length respectively. In the border length matrix, this
means the longer the border length between two countries, the larger the
potential spillover effect. For secondary neighbours, a dummy variable is
used to capture all secondary neighbours (not directly contiguous) within a
1 000 kilometre radius, with an alternative measure using exact geographi-
cal distance of the closest route between the host country and all secondary
neighbours up to 1 000 kilometres.
Specifically, with the minimum distance method, secondary neighbour
weights are constructed by taking the 1 000 kilometre radius, less the mini-
mum distance between the two countries, which is then divided by the sum
of the minimum distances of all secondary neighbours for the host country.





where δ represents the distance between countries i and j, country i would
be the host nation and j a secondary neighbour. Thus, the further a sec-
ondary neighbour is from the host nation, the small is the spillover effect.7
7A graphical example of on the definition of primary and secondary neighbours can be
found in figure A1 in the Appendix. Primary neighbours share a border with the host
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As discussed earlier, a strong case has been made recently for moving
beyond simple geographic distance. It is likely that countries with similar
characteristics and links will have more impact on each other than closer
countries with less in common. To measure this political and economic dis-
tance, democracy and trade measures were taken from the Polity IV and
World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) respectively.8
Using a 21-point democracy scale, countries that are politically similar
will be weighted more heavily than countries with little political similarity.
To create this matrix, the host country’s polity score is divided by each of its
neighbours polity scores, giving each neighbour an individual ratio. These ra-
tios are then divided by the sum of all the host country’s neighbours ratios to
create country specific weights. This weight measures how politically differ-
ent the host nation is from each of its neighbours. For example, the average
polity score for Algeria (a host country) is 5.28, its two primary neighbours
Mali and Mauritania have polity scores of 9.25 and 4.96 respectively. In this
case, Algeria’s polity ratio to its primary neighbours will be 0.57 (5.28/9.25 =
0.57) and 1.06 respectively. These ratios are then divided by the sum of the
ratios (0.57+1.06 = 1.63) to get political distances of Mali and Mauritania
to Algeria. Since Mali is less politically similar to Algeria than Mauritania,
its weight of 0.35 (0.57/1.63 = 0.35) will be much smaller than Mauritania’s
0.65 (1.06/1.63 = 0.65). Thus Mali will considered further away to Algeria
than Mauritania and a conflict in Mali will have a lower spillover effect than
one occurring in Mauritania.
The construction of economic distance matrices follows very closely from
the border length approach. Using bilateral trade, the spillover effect of a
host nation’s conflict will be weighted more heavily to larger trading partners
than smaller trading partners. For the host nation, the bilateral trade to each
primary neighbour is divided by the sum the host nation’s bilateral trade to
nation, while a secondary neighbour are those who are within a 1 000km radius of the
host nation, but do not share a border.
8As suggested by Jaggers and Gurr (1995) the Polity IV variable is reworked to a full
21 point institutionalised democracy scale and trade is measured as average bilateral trade
between host and neighbouring countries.
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all primary neighbours. This means that the more the host nation trades with
a primary neighbour, the closer they are and the larger spillover effect from
a potential conflict will be. The political and economic distance matrices
are each used in conjunction with geographic distance matrices to create
weighted matrices that account for economic or political similarities across
geographical space. A combined matrix is also created where political and
economic distance is added to geographic geographic. All weighted matrices
are all row standardised.
Overall, the inclusion of the trade and democracy variables should provide
more realistic estimation results than simple geographic distance measures.
Spillover effects resulting from conflict are likely to be very different for coun-
tries that have high amounts of economic integration (proxied by bilateral
trade) with the conflict afflicted country than a country with minimal eco-
nomic relations. Politically, countries that are democratically similar will be
more institutionally linked and also be affected differently as compared to
politically dissimilar countries.
3.4 Data and Empirical Methods
Data for empirical analysis are taken from four sources, GDP per capita,
investment and population from the Penn World Tables version 7.1; educa-
tion data from Barro and Lee (2012) and Penn World Tables version 8.0;
and measures of armed conflict comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed conflict
Database, updated to 2010 by Themner and Wallensteen (2011).
Instead of using five-year averages and averages over the entire sample pe-
riod to measure short and long-run effects respectively, as the earlier papers,
a panel of annual data for the period 1960 to 2010 was constructed featuring
36 countries. The dependent variable, ∆ ln y, is defined as (ln(y1)− ln(y0))
and represents annual per capita GDP growth.9 A similar approach is used
9It should be mentioned that standard sources of data for African GDP have been found
to understate both the level and growth rate (Young, 2012). This however, is a problem
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for investment, which represents growth in the annual share of investment.
As in other studies (g + δ) is assumed to equal 0.05 and added to popula-
tion growth to form the term (n + g + δ). Amalgamating the Penn World
Table 8.0’s index of human capital, which is measured annually, with the
Barro and Lee (2012) education data set, which is measured every five years,
gave an annual measure of education attainment in secondary schooling as a
percentage of the population of the age of 25.
To consider if variations in conflict type matter, the conflict indicator
variable is split into three categories. The first conflict variable “conflict”
contains all conflicts (civil and interstate) recorded in the dataset to have
at least 25 battle related deaths per year, the second variable “intense”,
includes only those conflicts that have at least 1 000 battle related deaths
per year and finally, the variable “civil” comprise only intrastate conflicts of
more than 25 battle related deaths. Conflict duration, measured in months
of conflict in a calendar year, is also used to assess whether conflict length
matters.
A combination of CIA World Factbook and Gleditsch and Ward (2001)’s
minimum distance dataset was used to construct the different geographical
weight matrices, and these weight matrices were cross checked for consistency
with those used in (de Groot, 2010). The political and economic weight ma-
trices are constructed using Polity IV and World Bank’s WITS dataset. Table
3.2 presents summary statistics of the key variables used in the regression
analysis, while Table A12, in the appendix, provides a country list of the
sample and years of conflict per country between the period 1960 and 2010.
In undertaking empirical analysis within the field of conflict and economic
growth, data limitations are a problem. Countries that have experienced
war are likely to have the worst data and even though data quality has
improved, issues do remain. Some of the data issues relate to missing data
(e.g. growth, education and investment) for periods where a country was in
war (e.g. Angola and Sudan in the 1960’s) and no data for countries such
with all datasets and something that now cannot be dealt with, only be acknowledged.
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as Libya and Somalia, leaving a decreased sample of 36 countries. This,
however, still represents a reasonable coverage of African countries and is
consistent with other studies.
Table 3.2: Variable Description and Summary Statistics
Variable Variable Description Mean Std. Dev
gdp Real GDP per capita 1290 1605
invest Investment as a share of GDP 16.62 10.69
edu Percentage of secondary education 11.93 12.64
attained in the population older than 25
pop Population in 000’s 11663 17810
conflict Conflict indicator 0.17 0.37
intense Intense conflict indicator 0.06 0.23
civil Civil war indicator 0.13 0.33
∆gdp Growth rate of real per capital GDP 0.010 0.070
∆invest Growth rate of investment as share of GDP 0.014 0.250
∆edu Growth rate of education attainment 0.053 0.052
n+ g + δ Population growth rate + 0.05 0.075 0.060
used in Solow-style regressions
As Table 3.2 shows, for the 36 countries with available data, only 17%
of all observations fall under episodes of conflict, which constitutes 29 of
the 36 countries (81% of all countries in the sample have experience some
form of armed conflict), with 76% being in the form of civil conflict and
remainder recorded as interstate conflicts. Between 1960 and 2010, of all
the observed conflicts, 35% were considered intense conflicts with annual
battle deaths of over 1 000. Such widespread conflict (e.g. time and space)
suggest why Africa has struggled to maintain any form of improvement in
income, education and investment. Average income ($1290) and education
attainment (11.9% of population over the age of 25) remains the lowest in
the world, with average growth (1 and 5.3% respectively) equally dismal.
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3.5 Empirical Results
Taking the specification in equation 3.4 and introducing dynamics gives the
estimation equation:






βk lnxk,i,t−1 + θ1(confi,t)
+θ2Wpri(confpri,i,t) + θ3Wsec(confsec,i,t) + ηt + µi + νi,t (3.6)
where y is GDP per capita, x1 is investment as a share of GDP, x2 is
secondary educational attainment as a share of population over the age of 25
and x3 is the population growth + 0.05 or (n+ g + δ). The reparameterised
first order dynamic model has all non-dummy variables in log form, with ∆
representing the change in the dependent and explanatory variables. There
is also a lagged dependent variable and lagged levels of physical and human
capital. Wpri and Wsec are the contiguity matrices for primary and secondary
neighbours, varying in the type of contiguity matrix (e.g geographical, polit-
ical or economic similarities), which are interacted with neighbour respective
conflict indicators to generate the spillover variables. Finally, ηt and µi cap-
ture are time and country fixed effects respectively, while νi,t is the error
term.
The starting point for estimations is to regress the dynamic panel on the
usual determinants of growth then add in conflict experience for the host
country. These initial results, shown in Table 3.3, serve as benchmarks on
which further variables are added to account for spillover effects. In Ta-
ble 3.3 column 1, the results without host country conflict experience show
investment and initial income to be of the expected sign and statistically sig-
nificant, but, human capital is negative and significant. Population growth
plus 0.05, which theoretically should have a negative impact on per capita
GDP growth, is positive and statistically significant. This result for pop-
ulation growth, while opposite to theoretical predictions, is not uncommon
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within the literature, particularly for low-income developing regions such as
Africa or Asia and it certainly does not seem unreasonable in post-conflict
economies (Grier and Tullock, 1989).
Table 3.3: Growth Effects of Conflict, Varying Over Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Type Conflict Intense Civil
Variables ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y
∆ ln(inv) 0.360** 0.036** 0.036** 0.036**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
∆ ln(edu) -0.090** -0.086** -0.083** -0.087**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
ln(n+ g + δ) 0.093** 0.089** 0.091** 0.093**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
ln(y0) -0.024** -0.026** -0.025** -0.024**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ln(invt−1) 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(edut−1) -0.023** -0.022** -0.022** -0.022**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Conflict -0.015** -0.023** -0.012*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Year 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.941** -1.885** -1.923** -1.924**
(0.540) (0.539) (0.538) (0.539)
Observation 1765 1765 1765 1765
R-squared 0.096 0.102 0.101 0.100
Notes: Dependent variable: ∆ ln y; All regressions include time trend variable;
Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1
Similarly, the negative result for human capital is not unusual and Is-
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lam (1995) attributes the irregular results to the discrepancy between the
theoretical variable H (measuring quality) used in the model to the actual
variable (measuring quantity) used in regressions. Likewise, the education
variable in Murdoch and Sandler’s papers and de Groot (2010) vary in sign
and significance, indicating volatility in the variables performance. In the
case of Africa and many other low-income countries, the true levels of human
capital may not have increased much since 1960 and statistically, this leads
to a negative temporal relationship between human capital and economic
growth. Moreover, it is often the case that education attainment does not
always translate into increased productivity and in many African countries
the quality of education is a major concern.
To see if the choice of the human capital variable used in regressions
matter, the Barro and Lee’s education attainment variable was replaced by an
index on the returns to human capital, found in Penn World Tables 8.0. This
gave similar results, with human capital remaining negative and significant
across all three conflict specifications.10
Violent conflict in the host country has a significant negative influence on
economic growth and this is true for all three conflict types (columns 2 to
4). Not surprisingly, intense conflict (column 3), one which features more
than 1 000 battle related deaths in a year, has the largest negative impact
on growth, decreasing growth on average by 2.3 percentage points, while
all conflicts and civil conflicts decrease growth by 1.5 and 1.2 percentage
points respectively. The growth model results are impressively consistent
across these specification changes and remains so with the introduction of
the contiguity measures. For this reason, Table 3.4 only reports the coeffi-
cient estimates for the conflict and contiguity variables, using geographical
distance, rather than the whole model. These are the best fitting models,
in terms of R-squared, from a range of regressions run on conflict type (all
types of conflict, intense and civil conflict) and different weighted contiguity
matrices and considering both uni and multi-dimensional spillover effects.11
10See appendix Table A7 for estimation results varying in education attainment.
11The difference between the reported regressions and regressions with a lower R-squared
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Uni-dimensional effects are observed only when primary or directly con-
tiguous neighbours are involved, while multi-dimensional effects involve both
primary and secondary neighbours. Specifications 1, 3 and 5 represent uni-
dimensional spillovers, while 2, 4 and 6 are multi-dimensional. In all six
specifications, conflict in a host country is estimated to have a negative and
significant effect on host nation growth, with the spillover effects of conflict
on neighbouring countries’ growth rates differing. Although a host country
conflict, irrespective of type, negatively affects primary neighbour growth,
no such influence was found on secondary neighbours.12
Depending on conflict type and spillover dimensions, the results in Ta-
ble 3.4 point to a host-country conflict having a negative growth impact
on primary neighbours of between 1.2 to 2.0 percentage points. Interest-
ingly, the coefficient sizes for primary neighbours are marginally smaller
when multi-dimensional spillover effects are captured as compared to only
uni-dimensional spillover effects. This may be indicative of a small “bounce
back” effect primary neighbours experience from its contiguous neighbours
(e.g. a host nations secondary neighbour).13
Interpreting the coefficients for neighbours is slightly different to that of
the host nation, as the conflict coefficients in Table 3.3 measures an individual
country effect while coefficients reported in 3.4 are measuring a neighbour-
hood effect. Since one has to take into account that each country has several
neighbours, this means dividing the coefficients of WpriConfpri by the average
number of neighbours. A host nation has on average 4.25 primary neighbours,
translating to a per country influence of 0.235 ( 1
4.25
), which implies that a
host country conflict (column 2) will on average reduce a primary neighbour’s
growth by 0.28 (0.235*-0.012*100 = -0.28) percentage points. Depending on
was negligible, with all variables of the same sign and significance. Of the different con-
tiguity matrices, border lengths for primary neighbours and minimum distance between
nations for secondary neighbours provided the best fit.
12An interesting note is the coefficient for secondary neighbours in specification 6, Table
3.4. Although it is not significant the coefficient is larger and not characteristic of the
results in general.
13All coefficient interpretations, henceforth, will be based on the multi-dimensional
spillover specifications.
60
the types of conflict, this negative effect varies from 0.45 percentage points
for intense conflicts to 0.35 for civil wars. The spillover effect from a conflict
to primary neighbours is calculated to be roughly 20% ((0.28/1.4)*100) of the
host country effect, with intense and civil wars approximately 20 and 29% of
the host country effect, respectively.14 These results are in line with Murdoch
and Sandler’s but differ from de Groot in finding no positive spillover effect
on secondary neighbours.
Table 3.4: Growth Effects of Conflict with Geographical Contiguity Matrices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict: Conflict Intense Civil
Weight:
Pri Border Border Border Border Border Border
Sec Dist Dist Dist
Variables ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y
Conflict -0.015** -0.014** -0.023** -0.023** -0.012* -0.012*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
WpriConfpri -0.013* -0.012
† -0.020** -0.019* -0.016* -0.015*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
WsecConfsec -0.008 -0.010 -0.017
†
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Constant -1.882** -1.874** -1.827** -1.789** -1.951** -1.994**
(0.538) (0.538) (0.540) (0.542) (0.539) (0.539)
Observations 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765
R-Squared 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.102 0.104
Notes: Dependent variable: ∆ ln y; Variable y0 represents lagged dependent
variable (e.g. ln(61)− ln(60)) and is interpreted as initial income; All regres-
sions include time trend variable; Clustered standard errors in parentheses;
Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1
14Since coefficients for secondary neighbours are insignificant, no conversion to per coun-
try effects are needed.
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To consider the more comprehensive definition of distance discussed above,
new contiguity matrices are constructed by reweighting the geographic dis-
tance contiguity matrices with matrices that capture economic and political
distances and the results for the variables of interest are presented in Table
3.5.
Specifications 1, 3 and 5 estimates spillovers using weights that contain
a measure of democratic (a 21 point democratic variable) and geographic
distance, while specifications 2, 4 and 6 use a measure of economic (average
bilateral trade) and geographic distance. The results for conflict afflicted
countries are identical to those in Table 3.3 and 3.4, with coefficients ranging
between 1.2 and 2.3 percentage points across the specifications. Again, there
seems to be no significant spillover effect of conflict on secondary neigh-
bours. The coefficients for primary neighbour conflict, weighted first with
democratic distance (columns 1, 3 and 5) and second with bilateral trade
(columns 1, 3 and 5), are negative and significant, but smaller than the
non-reweighted matrix results in Table 3.4. On average, the difference in
coefficient sizes varies from the marginally lower 8% for all conflicts to as
large as 16% for intense conflicts.15 This is an interesting result, suggesting
that studies which only use geographical distance could be overestimating
the negative spillover effects of conflict.
Using political and economic distances measures means that the weights
are reallocated in such a way that countries that may be close geographically
are now “further away” and vice versa. Since the contiguity matrix remains
a representation of distance, the reweighted matrices that include economic
and political similarities are simply a more sophisticated distance measure
giving weights reflecting a relative distance between countries. To get a
better idea of what this means, consider the country case of Mali in 2007,
which has seven primary neighbours, two of which were involved in conflicts
(e.g. Algeria and Niger). Using only the geographic distance weighting,
conflicts in Mali’s primary neighbours is estimated to have a negative spillover
15This dissimilarity is calculated by taking the difference of the coefficients in Table 3.3
and 3.4, and divided by the coefficient in Table 3.3 (e.g. ((0.13-0.12)/0.13 = 0.077).
62
effect on Mali’s economic growth of 0.36 percentage points. By adjusting
the contiguity matrix to allow for political and economic similarities with
neighbours, the spillover effect is reduced to 0.31 and 0.26 percentage points
respectively, while a combination of the trade and polity weights would lower
it to 0.28 percentage points. Estimates for the combined effect (political and
economic distance) can be found in Table A8 in the appendix. This negative
effect is expected to be between the weighted trade and polity coefficients
since the combined effect is a normalised weight of the two separate matrices.
Table 3.5: Growth Effects of Conflict with Political, Economic and Geo-
graphical Contiguity Matrices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict: Conflict Intense Civil
Weight: Polity Trade Polity Trade Polity Trade
Pri Border Border Border Border Border Border
Sec Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist
Variables ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y
Conflict -0.015** -0.014** -0.023** -0.023** -0.012* -0.012*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
WpriConfpri -0.012* -0.010* -0.016* -0.010
† -0.013* -0.012*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
WsecConfsec -0.005 -0.008 -0.017 -0.003 -0.014 -0.001
(0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Constant -1.867** -1.846** -1.781** -1.872** -2.015** -1.928**
(0.538) (0.538) (0.541) (0.540) (0.539) (0.539)
Observations 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765
R-Squared 0.104 0.105 0.105 0.103 0.103 0.104
Notes: Dependent variable: ∆ ln y; Variable y0 represents lagged dependent
variable (e.g. ln(61)− ln(60)) and is interpreted as initial income; All regres-
sions include time trend variable; Clustered standard errors in parentheses;
Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1
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Computing spillovers using only border distance, the weight of Algeria and
Niger on Mali is 0.19 and 0.11 respectively. This combines to give a weight
of 0.30, which translates to a conflict spillover of -0.36 (0.30*-0.012*100 =
-0.36) percentage points, where the -0.012 is the coefficient of WpriConfpri
from Column 2, Table 3.4. Similar exercises are done for the polity, trade
and combination of polity and trade weights. For example, the polity spillover
weight of Algeria and Niger on Mali is 0.22 and 0.04 respectively, giving a
total weight of 0.26. This converts to a conflict spillover effect on growth of
-0.31 percentage points.
For Mali, it seems that the main source of this spillover reduction when
moving beyond the geographical distance measure is Niger, 0.04 using the
polity weight, compared to 0.11 when using geographical weights. Although,
relative to other primary neighbours, Niger shares a reasonably sized border
with Mali (11 percent of Mali’s total border distance), it is very different
politically and trade between the two countries is of a minuscule amount.
Thus, contiguity weights that only use geographical distance has the potential
to hide complex relationships between countries such as that of politics and
economics. Given the above, spillover effects using only geographical distance
can be overstated since countries that were initially thought to be close are
actually further away. While it is also possible that introducing the political
and economic distance measures could increase the spillover estimates, it
would appear that for these African countries, the estimated spillover effects
of conflict are reduced. In fact, across all regressions, the average spillover
effects using the new “hybrid” weights are lower than before.
A major concern with this type of analysis is whether the results are be-
ing driven by the particular choice of data, variables or estimation method.
To evaluate the robustness of the results, the regressions are rerun using
different data sets, removing outliers, replacing the dynamic panel approach
with Murdoch and Sandler (2002b) and de Groot (2010)’s estimation method
and substituting the conflict indicator with conflict duration. Using different
datasets for population growth, investment, per capita GDP and education
did not change the significance or sign of the results, while the main es-
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timation results were unchanged when country outliers such as Botswana,
Lesotho and Sudan are removed.16 As Table A10 shows, changing the es-
timation method to that of Murdoch and Sandler and de Groot’s led to a
slight decrease in the significance of primary neighbour spillovers, but the
estimate remains statistically significant and negative. In terms of spillover
effects onto secondary neighbours, the estimation result remains negative and
insignificant. Finally, replacing the conflict indicator variables with conflict
duration led to changes in the results, (see Table A11 in Appendix) decreas-
ing the significance of neighbour country spillover effects to the point where a
host-country conflict has no regional spillover effects. But as in other studies,
the conflict duration variable in this chapter is outperformed by the conflict
dummy variable for all specifications suggesting that it is the mere presence
and not the duration of conflict that matters.
3.6 Conclusion
Conflict can be a major barrier to development and yet despite a large litera-
ture on the determinants of conflict, there has been relatively little empirical
analysis of its economic effects and even smaller literature dealing with the
spillover effects it can have on neighbours. This chapter has added to the
limited literature by providing an analysis on the spillover effects of conflict
using a balanced panel of 36 African countries for the period 1960 to 2010.
It provides results that show consistency with previous studies, in finding a
negative effect of conflict on the host economy and negative spillover effects
on neighbours. Using weighted matrices for the conflict variable based on
distance measures and distinguishing between primary and secondary neigh-
bours, suggests that primary neighbours are affected by conflict, but not
secondary neighbours, an equivalent result to Murdoch and Sandler, but dif-
fering from de Groot.
Recognising that geographical distance may not be the only relevant fac-
16See Appendix Table A9 for estimation results.
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tor and measure of distance when considering the proximity of neighbours,
measures of distance that incorporate political and economic factors are in-
troduced into the weighted matrices, giving a new determinant of distance.
The result of this was to decrease the estimated negative spillover effect of
conflict by a considerable amount and this estimate seemed robust to data
and specification changes. This does not alter the finding that conflict can
be devastating to both countries engaged in the fighting and their neigh-
bours, but suggests that care is needed in judging the effects of conflict on
neighbours, as only looking at geographical distance is not enough.
Finding results of significant primary country spillovers that are consistent
with those of Murdoch and Sandler provides further and updated support for
their assertion that aid providers need to consider supporting entire conflict
regions and not just conflict burdened countries. The results also suggest that
assistance should be focused on host countries and close neighbours, with
less emphasis on secondary neighbours or conflict duration. Additionally,
the definition of close should be determined by more than just geographical
distance, but also political and economic distance. Finally, aid is potentially
necessary in all conflicts and not, as de Groot (2010) suggests, simply in the
case of most violent forms.
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CHAPTER 4
The Determinants of Civil War and Excess Zeroes
4.1 Introduction
Civil war reverses development, it diverts resources from productive activities
to destruction. It can be considered a double loss since there is the oppor-
tunity cost of these productive resources and loss from the damage that it
inflicts (Collier et al., 2003). Just as measuring these conflict costs is of great
importance, understanding the factors which make civil conflict more or less
likely to occur is also an important developmental concern.
Violent internal conflict has ravaged many countries in the world. Since
1960, the average prevalence of civil war is about 12%, with a peak of 17%
in the years 1990 and 1991 (Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005; Themner and Wal-
lensteen, 2014). This led scholars to ask the question: why is there so much
civil war in the world? To understand the forces behind the source of this
human suffering, research to answer why civil wars occur has become a ma-
jor focus. Following the seminal contributions of Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
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and Fearon and Laitin (2003) empirical work on the causes of civil war has
burgeoned, providing valuable insights into the role economic factors play in
civil war initiation, continuation and potential end (Blattman and Miguel,
2010).
In empirical research almost all studies use some form of probit or logit
model to estimate a zero-one dependent variable on a panel or cross-section
of countries. There is, however, a potential that these models do not perform
well in situations where there are a large number of zeroes in the dependent
variable, a likely case for civil conflict as, fortunately many country-year
observations are zero (e.g. peace). Until recently there has been little recog-
nition of this issue, possibly because earlier models were estimated on cross
section data, five year average panels or lacked the appropriate empirical
tools, but the use of annual data in panels has made it an issue of greater
concern. Using a probit or logit model in the presence of excess zeroes can
potentially lead to biased estimates due to the correlation of the error term
with the explanatory variables (Bagozzi et al., 2015).
In conflict studies the dependent variable normally takes a binary form,
where the value one is recorded when the number of battle-related deaths
exceeds a particular bound (e.g. 1000) and zero otherwise. This zero how-
ever, encompasses a situation when the number of battle related deaths is
zero and there is complete peace and one where there are minor conflicts
still present with the battle related deaths below the defined threshold. In
addition, heterogeneity across countries means that a zero may represent a
break between conflicts in a conflict ridden country or a year of peace in
a completely peaceful country. Consider the difference between a zero for
a country such as Sweden or Australia which has almost no chance of civil
war, and a zero for countries like Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or
Cambodia, where civil war risk is considerably higher. Thus, when coded
uniformly, the zeroes from the different countries can come from two distinct
processes and not taking this into account can lead to statistically biased esti-
mates when evaluating the impact of explanatory variables on the dependent
conflict variable.
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Another issue relates to the choice of models. When the conflict dependent
variable has excess peace observations or zeroes, probit and logit models can-
not statistically account for the observable and latent factors that generate
these high proportions of zeroes. The normal probit and logit models gen-
erate only one latent equation and are unable to account for or differentiate
between the different additional weights put on zero observations, especially
if the zeroes relate to different processes. Using probits or logits in hypothe-
sis testing could lead to model misspecification (Harris and Zhao, 2007). A
further concern is whether the probit or logit models conform to the process
that generated the data. In the case of civil conflict, it can be characterised
as an event of rare occurrence where research has suggested a Poisson distri-
bution to better suit the data than logistical or normal distributions (Smith
and Tasiran, 2012).
To get some idea of the likely effect of using normal logit or probit models,
when a split population or zero-inflated model might be more suitable (see
Bagozzi et al. (2015)), this chapter starts by applying a zero-inflated Poisson
model to the data set of a published study by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002)
on the determinants of civil war prevalence, considering the impact on the
results and its implications. Following from the data replication, the chapter
then uses the zero-inflated Poisson to revisit the greed and grievance debate
on an updated data set of 134 countries for the period 1960 to 2013. The
next section gives a brief review of the determinants of civil war literature.
This is followed by an overview of the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model.
Section four then provides the results of the replication analysis of Elbadawi
and Sambanis (2002). Thereafter, section five presents the empirical re-
estimation of the greed-grievance argument, applying the ZIP model to the
new data set. The final section offers some conclusions, with discussion on
the implications of future civil war research.
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4.2 Evidence on the Causes of Civil Conflict
and Excess Zeroes
Civil conflict, an increasingly numerous phenomenon, can be explained through
concepts of motivation and feasibility. A distinction made obvious in the
Collier and Hoeffler (2004)’s econometric model of civil war. Based on a
rational choice model, rebellion and conflict might be motivated purely by
greed, where income is achieved during the rebellion from looting or after a
successful rebellion from control of state revenues. Alternatively, rebellion
might be purely motivated by grievance, where there is either a genuine or
perceived injustice that needs to be redressed. In this case, the probability
of conflict increases as benefits rise relative to costs. These conflicts have
most commonly been thought of as being caused by differences in religion,
ethnicity, income and class. Yet, until recently none of these commonly held
views have been the subject of empirical testing. Since then, a number of pa-
pers by the likes of Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) have tackled these issues, turning statements
of correlation into causal relationships.
Literature on trying to find these causal relationships of civil conflict have
been dominated by cross-country regressions, with a consensus been devel-
oped on factors that make countries more prone to civil war. They are
considered more likely to occur in countries that are poor, have low growth
rates, are easily subjected to adverse income shocks and have high depen-
dence on primary commodity exports (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). These
causal relationships depicted by income, commonly grouped as “greed” vari-
ables, are interpreted as lack of opportunities which make rebel recruitment
and participation easier (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). The opportunity cost
for rebels is considered lower for countries with low growth and income, while
chances of gain from war is much higher. Countries with high proportion of
primary commodity exports in their GDP are thought to be more prone to
conflict due to natural resources acting as a source of finance for rebellion
and weakening institutions (Humphreys, 2005; Robinson et al., 2006).
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Early studies by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
argue that these economic incentives are decisive in predicting civil war,
but political grievance have little explanatory power. An assertion that has
been backed up by the likes of Hegre et al. (2001), Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005), Ross (2006), Besley and Persson (2014) and Hoeffler (2012).
Despite the theoretical links between grievance and civil war, various authors
find variables proxying for factors such as political rights, income inequality,
ethnicity and religion to add little explanatory power to civil conflict. So far
most of the discussion on the determinants of civil war has focused on civil
war onset or incidence, but there has also been work on the prevalence of
civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Besley and
Persson, 2010). Although studies on civil war incidence consider the start of
wars and analysis of its prevalence assess start and continuation, they share
common empirical results.1 Irrespective of whether studies consider civil war
prevalence or incidence, economic factors are estimated to better predict an
occurrence of civil war than factors relating to grievance.
Following these initial contributions, the literature on the determinants of
civil war has seen many diversifications with research moving in the direc-
tion of improving causal identification, measurement and conflict definition.
Although there is a general consensus linking civil conflict to low levels of
income and negative income shocks, the direction of the causation is con-
tested. To address this endogeneity concern, scholars have tried lagging the
explanatory variables, but the most success has come from the use of ex-
ogenous variation in rainfall as an instrumental variable for income growth
(Miguel et al., 2004). By instrumenting income growth with rainfall growth,
Miguel et al. (2004) find a 5% drop in income growth leads to an increase in
civil conflict likelihood in the following year by almost 10%. A result that
has since been supported among 60 quantitative studies, where warmer tem-
peratures or extremes in rainfall is causally associated with changes in civil
1Prevalence can be defined as the likelihood of observing a civil war at any point in
time Y (t), estimating the probability of that Y (t) = 1 is the sum of the probability that
war occurs at time t contingent on there being no war at t − 1 and the probability that
war occurs at time t given that war had been ongoing at time t− 1.
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war (Hsiang et al., 2013).
With the literature moving towards finding better causal identification,
other scholars have looked to illustrate the importance of better measure-
ment. For instance, Ross (2006) argue that compared to older natural re-
source measures, improved measures of oil and diamond deposits are strongly
associated with more civil conflict. Likewise, the lack of significance of the
objective grievance variables has been strongly contested by political scien-
tists. Most recently by Buhaug et al. (2014), who suggests that the lack of
significance had to do with the poorly measure proxy variables (e.g. Gini co-
efficient and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation) used in previous research. By
using variables that better reflect ethnic and income inequality, the authors
find that political and economic grievances do matter.
As the civil conflict literature advances to deal with issues arising from
the original contributions, some empirical questions do remain. There is
currently little agreement on the correct econometric specification, authors
vary in the use to annual versus five-year periods, the definition of civil
conflict, the appropriate estimator for these rare events and the degree of
measurement error in the dependent and independent variables (Blattman
and Miguel, 2010). Sambanis (2004) found major differences in the datasets
used by various authors, with most attributed to the different definitions
of civil war, while others such as Vance and Ritter (2014) and Smith and
Tasiran (2012) have questioned the estimators used to study these rare events.
Interestingly, looking back at the literature, one sees that almost all empirical
research on civil war has used some form of probit or logit model to estimate
a set of explanatory variables on a zero-one dependent variable. Yet recent
analysis have suggested that research using these models can potentially run
into econometric challenges due to two important issues.
Firstly, the use of a zero-one indicator variable to denote conflict or peace
often runs into the problem of excess number of zero observations (e.g. peace
observations) These zeroes, often in the region of 80% of total observations,
have the potential to be heterogeneous and come from different data gen-
erating processes. In this case, estimates that use the common probit or
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logit models to determine civil war risk may run into issues of model mis-
specification and biased estimates (Bagozzi et al., 2015). To navigate this
issue, Bagozzi et al. (2015) suggest that an alternative method, specifically
a split-population or zero-inflated model, should be used to address excess
zeroes in the dependent conflict variable. Using this method, they find that
when the dependent variable contains excess zeroes, estimates which use zero-
inflated or split population models are more reliable and consistent compared
to those from ordinary probit or logit models. Furthermore, they indicate
zero-inflated models produce more accurate coefficient estimates of key inde-
pendent variables on conflict outcome.
The second issue on an appropriate estimator follows from concerns of
whether probit or logit models used in the estimation of civil war risk con-
forms to the process that generates the data (Smith and Tasiran, 2012).
Richardson (1960) initially found civil wars starting per year to closely fit
the theoretical Poisson distribution of rare events, a result confirmed by
Wilkinson (1980) and Benoit (1996). It would seem that in the case of civil
war, an event count process that is characterised by having a rare occurrence,
a Poisson distribution is likely to better suit the data than logistical or nor-
mal distributions. By combining Bagozzi et al. (2015) use of split-population
models with the suggestion of a Poisson distribution to better fit the data, a
zero-inflated Poisson model is tested as the preferred empirical model.
While research on civil wars have “mushroomed” to numerous avenues,
this chapter looks to revisit the origin of the determinants of civil war, retrac-
ing back to the initial greed versus grievance argument and addressing the
main concern of appropriate estimators, with emphasis on conflict definition
and better variable measurement. If using a more appropriate estimator for
rare events do matter, then the existing analyses on civil war risk, with greed
variables commonly thought to outweigh grievance terms, may be called into
question. These studies may be prone to estimation bias as not all zeroes
represent true peace, and thus it becomes difficult to pinpoint the true un-
derlying causes of civil conflict.
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4.3 Modelling Zero-Inflation in Civil Conflict
In most analyses on the determinants of civil conflict, an ordered dependent
variable is used in which a given country-year is assigned a zero for peace
and a value of one when violence between the state another side reaches a
given threshold, classifying it as a civil war. This would generally mean that
there are a large number of zero observations as peaceful years will dominate
conflict years. These zeros can be considered as reflecting rather different
states, one where the structural and societal forces ensure a zero probability
of civil conflict regardless of greed or grievance incentives and another that
reflects a break in fighting and a high probability of returning to conflict.
The first group of zeros will often be advanced or welfare economies, such
as Norway, Sweden, or Japan and can be labelled “complete-peace” while
the second group, are often found in developing regions such as sub-Saharan
Africa, Asia or Latin America, from which the zeroes can be labelled as
“incomplete-peace”. The main difference between the first and second type
of zero is that while the probability of transition into war for first type is
zero, the probability for the “incomplete-peace” group is not. In the case
of a “incomplete-peace” incentives resulting from opportunity or grievance
can induce violent conflict. There is also a third type of zero observation
where there is still fighting taking place, but the violence has not reached
the 1 000 battle related deaths threshold that is used to define a civil war.
Such cases can be labelled as “incomplete-war”. Given the high proportion
of heterogeneous zeroes in the analysis, using ordinary probit or logit models
may not be an appropriate tool for statistical inference and can potentially
give biased estimates (Bagozzi et al., 2015).
To shed some light on the above mentioned types of zeroes, the world map
in figure 4.1 below provides a breakdown of countries that are categorised as
“complete peace” (white), “incomplete-peace” (light grey) and “incomplete-
war”.2 Interpretation of the illustrated map is intuitive, countries in the least
2Countries highlighted in white are those that have never experienced a civil conflict and
thus labelled as “complete peace” . Those coloured in light grey are countries that have
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developed regions of the world, such as Africa, South-east and Central Asia
are often found to be in the category of “incomplete-peace”or “incomplete-
war”. By contrast, highly developed countries and democracies, such as those
found in Europe, North America and parts of Oceania almost always belong
to the “complete peace” group.
Figure 4.1: Complete peace, incomplete peace and civil war intensity
With evidence of the large amounts of heterogeneous zeroes, a more satis-
factory estimation alternative is to use a split population or two-part model
as proposed by Harris and Zhao (2007) and Vance and Ritter (2014). This is
typically in the form of a zero-inflated models, or in this case a zero-inflated
Poisson model, where estimations follow two stages. The first of the two
latent equations, stage one, is a selection equation, while the second stage is
a Poisson outcome equation. This splits the observations into two processes,
each potentially having different sets of explanatory variables. In the con-
text of civil war prevalence, zero observations in process 0 (wi = 0) include
inflated zeroes that never experience civil conflict (e.g. Sweden), while zero
experienced some form of minor civil violence (e.g. between 25 and 999 battle related
deaths in a given year) over the past 54 years and can be considered as “incomplete-
peace” and “incomplete-war” . Countries in dark grey are those that have had intense
civil conflicts totalling over 1 000 battle related deaths in a year and can be considered as
a truly conflict group.
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observations in process 1 (wi = 1) includes cases for which the probability of
transitioning into a civil conflict is not zero and civil war casualties have not
reached the lower bound (or limit) of 1 000 battle related deaths. The binary
variable w indicates the split between process 0 (with wi = 0 for no war) and
process 1 (with wi = 1 for war). w is related to the latent dependent variable
w∗i so that wi = 1 for w
∗
i > 0 and wi = 0 for w
∗
i ≤ 0, where w∗i now represents
the propensity to enter process 1 and is given by the split probit (1st stage)
equation:
w∗i = xiγ + µi (4.1)
where xi is a vector of covariates, γ is its coefficients and µi is the error
term. The probability of i falling into process 1 is Pr(wi = 1|xi) = Pr(w∗i >
0|xi) = Ψ(xig), and the probability that it is in process 0 is Pr(wi = 0|xi) =
Pr(w∗i <= 0|xi) = 1−Ψ(xiγ), where Ψ(.) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. For the Poisson outcome equation, the propensity for
participation in which the response variable Yi (i.e conflict) has a distribution
given by:
Pr(Yi = yi) =
 wi + (1− wi)






, yi > 0
(4.2)
where the parameters λi and wi depend on vectors of covariates xi and zi,








) = ztiγ (4.4)
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In this ZIP model, the matrices z and x contain different sets of experimen-
tal factor and covariate effects that relate to the probability of the “zero-
state”(zero probability of civil war) and the Poisson mean in the “nonzero-
state”(probable civil war), respectively. Thus, the γ’s have interpretations in
terms of the factor level effect on the probability that there is a zero probabil-
ity of conflict and the β’s have the interpretation of the effect on the average
risk of civil war when the probability is non-zero. Following Lambert (1992)
the ZIP model (equation 4.2) can be regressed using maximum likelihood
with an Expectation-maximum (EM) algorithm.3
While empirical research on the determinants of civil conflict has gener-
ally followed a more standard approach of assuming normality, conflict data
is produced in a discrete and countable manner and the number of events
can also never be negative or a non-integer. This does not suggest a normal
or logistical distribution and the error terms in a regression would not be
normally distributed and the observed variables would not be a linear func-
tion of the covariates (Benoit, 1996). When civil conflict is a random event,
and is observed at the end of each observation period i (common in conflict
studies), then the data will conform to a Poisson process which has a rate of
occurrence λ, where λ > 0, as long as the zero events occurred at the start
of the period and no more than one event occurs at the same time. Both
these assumptions are satisfied in civil war research, as firstly, by definition,
no more than one civil war can occur in a given country. Secondly, since
conflicts are only recognised if the threshold (either more than 25 or 1000
battle-related deaths in a given year) has been reached at the end of a cal-
endar year, occurrences in the previous period are considered independent
events. In other words, conflict events that occur must be both stationary
and independent. Additionally, Benoit (1996) stated the possibility of over-
dispersion in the Poisson estimates and suggested using negative binomial
as an alternative. This does not seem to be the case here as the variance
and mean in the data sets are not statistically different from each other and
3For full derivation of the model see Lambert (1992) and Hall (2000).
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insignificant log-likelihood ratio tests for alpha=0 rejects the notion that a
zero-inflated negative binomial is preferred to the zero-inflated probit model.
Thus, the Poisson distribution used in this chapter seems theoretically more
suitable than the normal or logistical distributions and has been shown to fit
the distribution of conflicts over time.
The use of ZIP model allows more accurate estimates to be obtained
compared to using standard probit or logit models, as the probability of
a zero observation is now modelled conditional on the probability of zero
from the Poisson process plus the probability of being in process 0 from
the splitting equation. It should be noted that the usefulness of the model
(i.e. unbiased estimates) declines when the size of the split in the sample
population becomes very big or very small and can lead to biased results,
with statistical inference increasingly difficult as the proportional of zeroes
gets closer to one. Bagozzi et al. (2015) suggests that this will become an
issue when there is less than 10 percent or greater than 90 percent of zero
observations.
4.4 An Empirical Investigation
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) provide an influential contribution to the
“greed-grievance” debate by combining Collier and Hoeffler (2004) model of
civil war onset with Collier et al. (2004) model of civil war duration. Their
model predicts the prevalence of civil conflict, based on opportunities for
rebellion against its constraints. These opportunities are divided into greed
versus grievance or rebellions that generate profit versus rebellions triggered
by genuine grievance. They code incidents as civil conflicts using five cat-
egories, (1) the war caused more than 1 000 battle-related deaths, (2) it
challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognised state, (3) it oc-
curred in the territory of the state, (4) it included the state as a principle
combatant, and (5) the rebels were able to mount a organised military op-
position to the state. Their sample includes over 150 countries between the
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period 1960 to 1999, with a dependent variable having about 81 percent of
zero or peace observations. Using a probit model, Elbadawi and Sambanis
find that prevalence of civil war is consistent with earlier studies on war onset
and duration (Table 4.1, column 1). It is positively influenced by primary
commodity exports as a share of GDP (a proxy for “looting” or economic
opportunity), population and previous wars experiences in the past 10 years,
while the level of GDP, the growth of per capita GDP and squared term of
primary commodity exports as a share of GDP have negative effects. As
with most studies in the literature, grievance factors such as ethnic frac-
tionalisation, ethnic dominance and polity (proxy for political rights) were
statistically insignificant.
Given the potential for high proportion of heterogeneous zeroes, which
can be thought of as including “complete-peace” or “incomplete peace” , the
use of a simple probit can be questioned and a zero-inflated Poisson model
(ZIP) would seem more suitable. To evaluate these claims, this chapter
first estimates the main Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) specification using
a normal probit. This is followed by estimations using the ZIP model for
the Elbadawi and Sambanis data. The results for both are presented in
Table 4.1. The first set of results (1) provide the standard probit model
and the next two columns (2) give the ZIP results, the first stage estimates
(Outcome) and the second stage (Inflation) estimates. In order to remain
consistent with Elbadawi and Sambanis, covariates in the outcome equation
of the ZIP model are identical to the normal probit. Moreover, in identifying
plausible indicators for conflict ”relevance”, variables that are included in the
inflation equation should directly influence the probability that a country in
any given year always experiences peace (i.e. per capita GDP, ethnic diversity
or political freedom).
The results reveal that in the case of the ZIP inflation equation, real GDP
has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood that a country-year to
be among the always zero or “complete peace” group. Thus, the higher a
country’s real GDP, the greater chance of it being always peaceful. In nu-
merical terms, if a country increases its real GDP by 1%, the likelihood of
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the country being in the ”complete peace” group would increase by a factor
of 1.001 (e.g. exp(0.0018)). Interestingly, primary commodity exports as
a share of GDP has no significant effect on the odds of always being zero.
Assessing the grievance variables reveals some more valuable insight on the
differences between the two types of zeroes or peace observations. Ethno-
linguistic diversity now has an impact on the likelihood of being completely
peaceful. This relationship is estimated to be parabolic, first decreasing and
then increasing.
In the context of the inflation equation, the coefficients represent the fac-
tor change in the probability of being completely peaceful compared to in-
complete peace. It is interesting to note that when the same variables are
included in both the outcome and inflation equations, the signs of the cor-
responding coefficients from the binary equation are often in the opposite
direction to coefficients in the outcome equation. This makes substantive
sense since the process in the inflation equation is predicting membership
in the group that is always peaceful, while the outcome equation predicts
conflict risk conditional on a country being able to experience a civil conflict.




Pri Exports/GDP 10.53* 9.488* -2.276
(4.136) (4.341) (5.061)
Pri Exports/GDP2 -21.24* -23.41*
(9.325) (11.31)
log real GDP -0.0003** -0.0004** 0.0018*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0009)
RGDPPC Growth -0.0899** -0.122**
(0.0286) (0.034)
Polity Index (1 lag) -0.0115 0.0135
Continued on next page
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Polity Index2 (1 lag) 0.0032 0.0035
(0.0041) (0.0042)
Ethno Diversity 0.0389 0.0656** -0.231**
(0.0258) (0.0178) (0.0759)
Ethno Diversity2 -0.0004 -0.0007** 0.0024**
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0008)







Zero Observations - 692
Log likelihood -189.771 -223.663
Wald χ2 33.11 -
Vuong test - 3.41
AIC 479.33 401.54
Notes: AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; Standard errors in parentheses;
Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1
Comparing the estimations on civil war prevalence, the probit and ZIP
estimates for the outcome equation (1) and (2) show similar coefficients for
most of the variables, but also a striking difference. Starting with the op-
portunity variables, primary commodity exports as a share of GDP is highly
significant and has a non-linear effect in predicting the probability of civil
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conflict. Income, both in GDP levels and growth in per capita GDP, are
negative and significantly related to civil war risk. These are consistent with
previous findings within the literature and can be thought of as both eco-
nomic incentives and costs of participation. While the zero-inflated Poisson
estimates of opportunity variables are consistent with the normal probit,
intriguing differences emerge in the grievance variable estimates. Ethnolin-
guistic diversity is now statistically significant, having a non-linear effect of
first increasing and then decreasing the risk of civil war prevalence.
A Vuong (1989) test and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) are run,
both favouring the zero-inflated Poisson model over the traditional probit
estimator. As a robustness check across the different specifications used by
Elbadawi and Sambanis, ethnic diversity is replaced with ethnic dominance
(See Table A13 in Appendix), revealing the same consistent results with
the additional polity index also becoming significant. All the coefficients in
the ZIP model, except log population and primary commodity exports as a
share of GDP have larger coefficients than in the standard probit, possibly
suggesting that not allowing for zero-inflation leads to civil war risk being
underestimated.
Empirical estimations using the Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) data pro-
vide a strong case for arguing that the determinants of conflict literature
should consider moving from standard probit and logit models to some form
of a zero-inflated model. If not, researchers risk both underestimating the risk
of civil conflict and making erroneous conclusions regarding its significance.
Having established that the zero-inflated models yields potentially better re-
sults for civil conflict prevalence, the next section develops the analysis by
estimating a more general greed-grievance model based upon the literature
and using data for the period 1960 to 2013.
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4.5 Greed vs. Grievance Revisited
To provide the opportunity to specify a general greed grievance empirical
model, a range of variables were collected based upon the debates in the lit-
erature. Proxies for greed or opportunity include real GDP, growth in GDP
per capita, degree of urbanisation, life expectancy and natural resource de-
pendence. For this study two sets of income variables were collected, from the
World Bank and Penn World Tables 8.0. Degree of urbanisation is measured
as the proportion of a country’s population living in an urban environment,
while life expectancy follows the usual measurement.4 Male secondary school
enrolment was not used in the estimations due to poor and incomplete data.
Following from the literature, natural resource dependence is measured by
the share of primary commodity exports in GDP. The World Bank provides
data for the period 1960 to 1999, which was cross referenced with Fearon
(2005) for consistency. The remaining 14 years are constructed using ex-
port data (primary commodities) provided by the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and GDP from the World Bank.
Taking into consideration the numerous debates on the measure of natu-
ral resource dependence and the type of commodities used, three additional
measurements are considered. A measure of oil production in metric tons
and oil exports greater than one-third of total exports are used to proxy
for oil abundance and dependence respectively.5 To distinguish between fuel
and non-fuel minerals with other primary commodities, a mineral depen-
dence variable was created. A country is considered mineral dependent if
its mineral exports constitutes 25% or more of a country’s total tangible ex-
ports. Percentage of mountainous terrain in a given country is included as
4This data is sourced from the World Bank, the degree of urbanisation can also be
thought of as a measurement of geographic dispersion, the greater the urbanisation, the
lower the geographic dispersion. All income figures are purchasing power parity (PPP)
adjusted.
5Oil production in metric tons is provided by Ross (2013), this data goes from
1932 to 2011, the additional two years were drawn from the same source as the au-
thor, US energy information administration website for international energy statistics:
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm.
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an indicator of military accessibility or safe havens for rebels
The grievance variables are, for the most part, common to those identified
by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003). This chapter
considers three general measures of grievance: ethnic and religious hatred,
political repression or freedom, and income inequality (horizontal inequal-
ity). Ethnic fractionalisation is the most commonly chosen indicator to test
the linkage between ethnicity and civil conflict.6 Measurements of ethnic
fractionalisation is borrowed from Collier and Hoeffler (2004), with ethnic
dominance used as alternative to ethnic hatred, which is measured as a bi-
nary variable taking on the value one if the largest ethnic group in a country
consists between 45% - 90% of the population. To measure religious hatred,
Collier and Hoeffler constructed a fractionalisation index analogous to ethnic
fractionalisation and this is in turn used in the estimation process.
Other things being equal, political democracy or freedom should be as-
sociated with less discrimination, repression and civil war. Data from the
Polity IV database is used to measure political rights, with the variable
polity ranging from -10 (high autocracy) to 10 (high democracy). The re-
lationship between political freedom and civil war has often been thought
of having a non-linear effect (Hegre et al., 2001). This hypothesis is tested
through the inclusion of polity squared term. In a recent paper by Buhaug
et al. (2014), the authors found that new grievance indices of horizontal in-
come inequality and political discrimination to perform much better than
conventional indicators. They argue that economic grievance is captured by
the relative gap between the mean national income and the income level of
the poorest and richest groups (positive and negative horizontal inequality),
while ethno-political grievance is measured by demographic size of the largest
discriminated ethnic group.7 This chapter uses these alternative variables as
substitutes in robustness checks for ethno-political and economic grievance.
6Initially used by Easterly and Levine (1997), the fractionalisation index follows in
accordance with Herfindahl’s formula, and is interpreted as the probability that two ran-
domly selected individual in a population belong to different ethnic groups.
7For full description and derivation of the variables see Buhaug et al. (2014)
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The control variables included in the model are the standard ones found
in the literature. Population, cold war and Africa feature in various spec-
ifications with their effects on civil war prevalence, apart from population,
subject to much empirical debate. Finally, the dependent variable used here
takes on a value of 0 for all peace year observations and a 1 for civil war
years. For all the observations in the sample, 15% are classified as civil war,
of which 11% had annual combat deaths ranging between 25-999 and 4% was
above 1000.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics - Means
Full Not No
Sample Always 0 Always 0 Civil war Civil war
Opportunity
Primary Commodity 0.156 0.178 0.139 0.109 0.164
Exports/GDP
GDP per cap 7931 14069 3311 3172 8699
GDP per cap growth 0.018 0.022 0.016 0.010 0.019
Mountains % 16.38 14.93 18.11 23.16 15.33
Rate of Urbanisation 46.94 56.00 39.73 40.61 47.92
Life Expectancy 61.61 66.15 57.98 59.41 61.95
Oil Production 17000 13700 19300 19100 16700
(Metric Tons 000’s)
Mineral Dependence 0.493 0.415 0.545 0.550 0.484
Oil Exports 0.187 0.155 0.208 0.168 0.189
Grievance
Ethnic Frac (C&H) 63.02 52.06 69.85 77.47 60.05
Ethnic Dominance 0.470 0.483 0.467 0.549 0.457
Religious Frac (0-100) 36.47 36.07 36.58 0.36 0.37
Polity IV (-10 to 10) 1.13 3.84 -0.73 0.97 1.30
LDG 0.056 0.024 0.081 0.142 0.042
NHI 1.189 1.064 1.278 1.398 1.155
PHI 1.201 1.086 1.287 1.224 1.197
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Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the above mentioned vari-
ables with a breakdown by conflict experience and always zeroes. These
results seem to support the central thesis that the different zeroes in the
sample are formed through completely separate processes. For the always
zero or “complete peace” group, GDP per capita, per capita GDP growth,
rate of urbanisation, life expectancy and political freedom are all higher than
the non-always zero group. Moreover, countries which are potentially com-
pletely peaceful all have lower levels of ethnic and religious fractionalisation
and income inequality.8 Estimated correlations suggest some association be-
tween income and inequality variables and the likelihood of a country being
completely peaceful versus incompletely peaceful. In episodes of civil con-
flict, GDP per capita, its growth, rate of urbanisation, life expectancy and
political freedom are all lower compared to times of peace. Similarly, ethnic
divisions, income inequality and substantial amounts of rough terrain are
higher in cases of civil war. Interestingly, primary commodity exports as a
share of GDP is on average lower in episodes of civil war compared to no
civil war.
Estimating the probability of civil conflict using ordinary probit regres-
sion, with the civil conflict dependent variable taking the value of one if
deaths total over 25 in a given battle or over 1000 in a given year and zero
otherwise, gave the results in Table 4.3. The standard probit results (1) show
GDP and per capita GDP growth to be highly significant in decreasing the
probability of civil conflict, with primary commodity exports as a share of
GDP also highly significant and non-linear. Primary commodity exports are
seen to initially decrease civil war risk, reaching a trough when it constitutes
about 33% of GDP, thereafter increasing civil war risk.9 This is a peculiar
finding which is considered opposite to the past literature. However, in light
of the summary statistics in Table 2, where primary commodity exports as
8ldg = largest discriminated ethnic group, phi = positive horizontal inequality (relative
gap between mean national income and income level of the richest group), nhi = negative
horizontal inequality (relative gap between mean national income and income level of the
poorest group)
9Differentiate the probability of civil war with respect to primary commodity exports
(4.197/2(*6.436)) = 0.326
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a share of GDP is lower for countries not in conflict, the result makes some
empirical sense. Turning to the objective grievance terms only the Polity
IV index squared is significant with none of the measures for ethnic and
religious diversity and (Collier and Hoeffler (2004)’s definition) having any
explanatory power. As for the control variables, population has a positive
and significant effect on civil war prevalence while the Cold War dummy is
negative and statistically insignificant. The likelihood ratio test of the corre-
lation coefficient (rho) suggests panel estimator to be preferred to a pooled
estimator. To see if a zero-inflated model would fare better in the context of
excess zeroes observations, the same specification is ran using a zero-inflated
Poisson model.
Table 4.3: Probit and ZIP Regression of Civil War Prevalence 1960-2013
(1) (2) (3)
Probit ZIP ZIP
Outcome Outcome Inflation Outcome Inflation
Opportunity
log RGDP -0.129* -0.988** 2.551** -0.962** 1.129**
(0.063) (0.032) (0.386) (0.038) (0.110)
RGDPPC Growth -2.396** -2.697** 9.793† -2.242** 2.392*
(0.506) (0.432) (5.412) (0.473) (1.059)
Pri Exports/GDP -4.145** -5.243** -2.842** 10.377**
(1.107) (0.747) (0.819) (2.231)
Pri Exports/GDP2 6.593** 7.324** 3.177* -19.618**
(1.571) (1.240) (1.257) (3.420)
log % Mountains 0.020 0.057* 0.060† 0.077
(0.094) (0.025) (0.025) (0.072)
Grievance
Polity Index 0.004 0.017** -0.534* 0.051* -0.270**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.218) (0.026) (0.074)
Polity Index2 -0.010** -0.009** 0.070* -0.013** 0.003
Continued on next page
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Table 4.3 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
Probit ZIP ZIP
Outcome Outcome Inflation Outcome Inflation
(0.001) (0.001) (0.029) (0.004) (0.008)
Eth Frac (C&H) 0.032 0.011† -0.043** 0.014† -0.084**
(0.024) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.014)
Eth Frac2(C&H) -0.001 -0.001** -0.001† 0.003**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Ethnic Dominance 0.326 0.298** -0.255 0.357** -0.123
(0.414) (0.098) (0.283) (0.111) (0.233)
Religious Frac -0.272 -0.193 1.085** -3.393
(0.682) (0.171) (0.239) (2.183)
Controls
log Population 0.498** 0.112** -3.080** 0.246** -0.998**
(0.125) (0.02) (0.444) (0.055) (0.131)
Cold War 0.084 0.083 0.220** 0.711**
(0.082) (0.067) (0.075) (0.191)
Constant 7.099** -2.979** 9.950** -6.086** -11.339**
(1.699) (0.513) (4.093) (0.651) (1.287)
Observations 4286 4286 4286
Zero Observations - 3382 3382
Log likelihood -1314.14 -2358.58 -2343.27
Wald χ2 159.34 - -
Vuong test - 7.70 8.33
AIC 4910.51 4761.18 4742.53
Notes: AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; Dependent variable: Conflict
prevalence; Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:** p<0.01,*
p<0.05,† p<0.1
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Starting with the inflation equation, the variables of real GDP, per capita
GDP growth, political freedom and ethnic diversity all represent plausible
indicators that influence the probability that a country always experiences
peace. To this end, the inflation equation (2) confirms that higher income
and political freedom does indeed lead to greater probability of being in the
“complete peace” group, while ethnic fractionalisation, ethnic dominance
and population all have a negative effect. The variation in sign between the
outcome and inflation estimates makes sense as one equation calculates the
likelihood of countries being in conflict and the other on the probability of
being in the completely peaceful group.
Moving onto the outcome equation, the zero-inflated Poisson model (2)
gives signs that are consistent with the standard probit, but there are sub-
stantial differences in the significance of the grievance terms. Primary com-
modity exports as a proportion of GDP shows the same effect as the probit
model, albeit at a higher turning point of 36% while income, both its level
and growth, decrease the likelihood that a country experiences civil conflict
conditional on that country being able to experience a conflict. Proxies for
ethno-political grievance are better represented using the zero-inflated models
than the standard probit model, with political freedom and ethnolinguistic
diversity now significant predictors of civil war prevalence. Both of these
variables feature in an inverse u-shape of first increasing and then decreasing
civil war risk. A captivating finding is that using the ZIP model, percent-
age of mountains terrain, a proxy for geographic dispersion which inhibits
government or military capacity, and ethnic dominance became positive and
statistically significant in explaining civil war prevalence.
In addition to having more explanatory power and significance in the
grievance variables, the ZIP estimates are shown to have lower standard
errors and higher log likelihood values than the normal probit, which suggests
a more accurate estimation outcome. The usual Vuong test and AIC are
run, both rejecting the probit model and favouring the zero-inflated Poisson.
As suggested in Cameron and Trivedi (2010), all regressions are estimated
using robust standard errors, while the proportion of zero observations in the
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sample (78.9%) falls within the accepted band of 10 to 90% (Bagozzi et al.,
2015).
Ensuring that the zero-inflated Poisson estimates are not driven by the
decision to include on specific variables relating to peace (e.g. income, po-
litical freedom etc.) in the inflation equation, a full model in which all the
covariates in the outcome equation is included in the inflation equation. The
results shown in (3) are consistent with the selective estimations found in (2).
The selective variables in the inflation equation are ones commonly thought
to have a direct impact on the probability of peace. Here comparison of
(2) and the full model seen in (3) is a test for researchers degrees of free-
dom, whereby a researcher could selectively choose specifications in order to
generate significant results or false-positives (Simmons et al., 2011). Similar
results in (2) and (3) suggest the model is well specified, consistent to various
specifications and not sensitive to researcher’s degrees of freedom.
To consider the robustness of the results, a number of alternative spec-
ifications are considered. Table 4.4 is one example, with horizontal income
inequality and ethnic discrimination added in place of ethnic dominance and
religious fractionalisation, which increased the number of observations by
over one hundred.10 These results remain consistent with earlier estimates,
where the zero-inflated Poisson model is preferred to the probit model in
almost all instances. Intriguingly, after changing the specification, the Cold
War variable is now negative and statistically significant, providing support
to Blattman and Miguel’s (2010) assertion that then number of civil wars
have declined after 1990.
Adding variables on income inequality provides a new dynamic to the
civil war prevalence process. Estimating the probability of being completely
peaceful, the results from the inflation equation suggest that high income
inequality between the poorest group and the country average decreases the
probability of peace, while increases in income inequality between the richest
group and the country level increases peace likelihood. Together, the two
10see Buhaug et al. (2014) for description of the income inequality and ethnic discrimi-
nation variables.
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horizontal income inequality measures offer some insight into the process of
a country’s peacefulness. Inequality has less meaning to the richest group,
but is substantially more important to the poorest group. The chances of not
being in “complete peace” or likelihood of violence is driven by the poorest
group, which form the majority of a country’s population. The richest has an
incentive to keep peace as it will retain their wealth, while the poorest will
have an incentive to work and overturn the inequality. As for the outcome
equation, only negative horizontal inequality (relative gap between mean
national income and income level of the poorest group) has a significant
positive effect on the likelihood of civil war. Higher ethnic discrimination,
measured as the proportion of the largest discriminated ethnic group to the
group in power, is also estimated to increase the likelihood of civil war. As
before, the ZIP reports higher log likelihood values and smaller standard
errors, with the Vuong test and AIC concluding that it is preferred to the
standard probit.






log real GDP -0.180* -1.002** 1.115**
(0.073) (0.037) (0.208)
RGDPPC Growth -2.537** -2.039** 2.035*
(0.507) (0.543) (1.037)
Pri Exports/GDP -4.335** -3.783**
(1.100) (0.854)
Pri Exports/GDP2 6.581** 4.045**
(1.569) (1.453)
log % Mountains 0.013 0.096*
Continued on next page
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Polity Index 0.003 0.045** -0.098*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.051)
Polity Index2 -0.010** -0.012** 0.023**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Eth Frac (C&H) 0.040† 0.026** 0.013
(0.022) (0.005) (0.085)
Eth Frac2 (C&H) -0.001 -0.001**
(0.001) (0.000)
ldg 0.821** 1.161** -19.76**
(0.220) (0.173) (3.415)
phi -0.137 -0.012 1.346**
(0.150) (0.070) (0.383)
nhi 0.561** 0.088* -0.969**
(0.245) (0.045) (0.268)
Controls
Population 0.552** 0.202** -2.311**
(0.124) (0.045) (0.380)
Cold War 0.008 -0.152*
(0.008) (0.076)
Constant 7.394** -3.405** 4.450*
(1.596) (0.619) (2.248)
Observations 4390 4390
Zero Observations - 3481
Log likelihood -1322.63 -1945.04
Continued on next page
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Wald χ2 169.66 -
Vuong test - 9.30
AIC 4838.92 3940.131
Notes: AIC = Akaike Information Criterion; Dependent variable: Conflict
prevalence; Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:** p<0.01,*
p<0.05,† p<0.1; ldg = largest discriminated ethnic group, phi = positive hori-
zontal inequality (relative gap between mean national income and income level
of the richest group), nhi = negative horizontal inequality (relative gap between
mean national income and income level of the poorest group)
Other variants of the zero-inflated Poisson were estimated replacing pri-
mary commodity exports with either mineral dependence, oil production
or oil export; replacing the polity index with the freedom house measure,
democracy and autocracy dummies; substituting income variables with ur-
banisation rate and life expectancy and adding an Africa dummy. The results
are shown to be relatively robust, with primary commodity dependence in-
creasing civil war risk, democracy, political freedom and higher urbanisation
decreasing civil war risk, and the Africa dummy having no special effect.11
The main results found in this chapter are two-fold. Firstly, unlike most
historical articles, explanations of civil war risk seems to rest with both greed
and grievance variables. Secondly, regressions of civil war prevalence seems
to perform better using the zero-inflated Poisson than the ordinary probit
models. The zero-inflated Poisson is able to statistically account for observ-
able and latent factors that produce different types of peace observations. In
this way the inflation equation was able to provide substantial understanding
on the different types of peace observations and its data generating process.
11See Appendix Table A14 and A15 for the additional results.
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The outcome equation also showed coefficients that are more accurate on
conflict outcome than standard probits since estimations were conditional on
the observation being able to experience a civil conflict.
Although the opportunity variables were always significant in both the
standard probit and zero-inflated Poisson, it is the grievance variables that
have provided the greatest insight. In the case of the ordinary probit, model
misspecification has biased the estimates giving greater weighting to oppor-
tunity variables over grievance variables. This led to most empirical work
finding opportunity or income variables as the main determinant of civil
conflict and brandishing grievance type variables as having little explanatory
power. As one takes a deeper look at what type of country is mostly associ-
ated with the always zero or “complete peace” group, the answer is often high
income countries. By not distinguishing the different zeroes, the normal pro-
bit gave a likelihood of war calculation that included countries conditioned
to not experience such an event. These countries’ main attribute is high in-
come, and thus income variables were estimated with greater emphasis and
significance, crowding out the explanatory power of grievance variables.
By using a zero-inflated model and splitting the estimation process into
two stages, greed and grievance variables are given equal emphasis which
results in a clearer picture that both ethno-political and economic grievance
matter, with substantial explanatory power in predicting civil war risk.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has made a contribution to the burgeoning literature on the
determinants of civil conflict by highlighting the possible impact of using the
standard probits or logits to model a situation when the binary conflict de-
pendent variable is characterised by excess zeroes. In such cases, the zeroes
are not homogeneous and these standard models are unable to account for
the factors that produce the high proportion of zeroes. From a civil war
perspective, there is a big difference between a zero that reflects peace in a
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peaceful country and one that reflects a lull in conflict or where the number
of battle deaths used in the definition of conflict falls below the threshold
used to construct the variable. A more satisfactory approach has been sug-
gested by Bagozzi et al. (2015), a zero-inflated model, which treats the excess
zeroes as a heterogeneous group of observations, accounting for observable
and unobservable factors that produce the different types of zeroes.
Applying this model to Elbadawi and Sambanis’ (2002) data and using
their model specification showed differing results with the grievance terms
becoming significant predictors of civil war. Doing a similar exercise on an
updated dataset of 134 countries for the period 1960 and 2013 and using a
general greed-grievance empirical specification, provided further support for
the need to recognise the problem of too many zeroes and a need to deal
with it within a zero-inflated model framework. Estimates using the ZIP
model were shown to have lower standard errors and higher log likelihood
values than the probit model and a comparison between the probit and ZIP
models again found substantial differences in the objective grievance vari-
ables. Unlike previous findings, civil war prevalence seems to be explained
by both greed and grievance variables. Income, natural resource dependence,
polity, ethnicity and income inequality were all found to play a significant
role in explaining civil war prevalence. These are important results which
suggest that if these models had been used earlier the trajectory of the greed
versus grievance debate might have been quite different. The implications
resulting from this chapter suggests a need for future research to recognise
the heterogeneity of observations that have so far been treated as homoge-
neous peace and to assign values to zeroes in order to better understand the




5.1 Summary of Findings
This dissertation has contributed to the economics of peace and security liter-
ature by focusing on the interplay between military spending, armed conflict
and economic growth. Specifically, intending to answer three questions: i)
What is the true effect of military expenditure on economic growth after
accounting for concerns of group heterogeneity and non-linearity? ii) Do the
costs of armed conflict spillover onto neighbouring countries and how far does
it reach? iii) What are the determinants of civil wars and are the correlates
different when more appropriate rare event estimators are used? These three
research questions are all interconnected and can have profound effects on
development. Another way to think about this is that both expenditures
in arms and conflict can have a negative impact on economic development.
This negative influence can lead to a greater chance of conflict which in turn
will further affect development, leaving affected nations in either a develop-
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mental or conflict trap. To answer the above mentioned questions, the thesis
develops three chapters with each exploring a relevant question.
Answering the first question, chapter two uses an exogenous Solow growth
model and dynamic panel estimation techniques to analyse military expendi-
ture’s effect on economic growth. The use of a theoretical model (e.g. Solow
growth model) allows for a definitive link between theory and econometrics, a
link often missing in modern macroeconomic regressions. The empirical evi-
dence shown in chapter two supports the view that military expenditure leads
to lower growth in per capita GDP both in the short and long-run. Using
a sample stratification approach, additional concerns of group heterogeneity
and non-linearity were considered. The results were mostly consistent with
the overall analysis of military spending having a negative and significant ef-
fect on growth. Only country sub-groups characterised as non-fuel resource
abundant, as low aid recipients, closed economies, democratic, autocratic or
middle income show military spending as having no burden on the economy.
One intriguing finding is that of all the estimated regressions, there was no
evidence of military expenditure having a positive effect on growth.
To answer the second question, chapter three adds to the literature on
costs of conflict by focusing on the spillover effects it has on neighbouring
countries’ economic growth. Using a general growth framework and spatial
econometric techniques, this chapter follows from the contributions of Mur-
doch and Sandler (2002b,a, 2004) and de Groot (2010) to develop a distance
measure which includes economic and political similarities. This is consid-
ered to reflect a more holistic measurement of distance than the use of only
geographic distance. The initial estimation results, using only geographic
distance, suggest conflict to have a substantial negative spillover effect on
neighbouring countries. This effect, however, is multidimensional and is lim-
ited to only directly contiguous neighbours, with non-contiguous neighgbours
experiencing no significant harm from armed conflict.
Subsequent estimations of conflict spillover are regressed using the con-
solidated and new weighted matrix containing geographic, economic and po-
litical distance. The empirical results show that conflict, irrespective of its
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type, has a significant and negative spillover effect on contiguous neighbours,
an effect that is smaller in magnitude when compared to using geography
alone as a distance element. The spillover effect on non-contiguous neigh-
bours remains insignificant. Results from the new contiguity matrix suggest
that studies using only geographic distance to measure conflict spillover have
potentially overestimated its effects. As argued in chapter three, distance
is more than just geography and important considerations are needed to be
made on notions of economic and political distance.
Chapter four looks to answer the third question regarding civil war preva-
lence. It looks to address the concern of estimation bias, model misspecifi-
cation and the appropriate estimator of rare events when there is a case of
excess zeroes of a heterogeneous nature in the dependent variable. The con-
tribution that this chapter makes to the empirical debate can be considered
two-fold; it questions which technique is a more appropriate in determining
civil war risk and secondly, it challenges the commonly held notion in eco-
nomics that greed or opportunity are the main drivers of civil conflict. To
determine the most appropriate estimation technique in civil war research,
this study applies the ZIP model to a past study on civil war prevalence
by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002). This data replication shows substantial
differences between the ZIP and the popular probit model used by Elbadawi
and Sambanis. While previously the authors found variables relating to greed
(e.g. GDP, GDP growth and natural resource dependence) as the only deter-
minants of civil war prevalence, both greed and grievance variables become
significant under the ZIP model. Variables such as ethnic diversity and polity,
which were generally considered to have little explanatory power, are now
estimated to be significant predictors if civil war. Moreover, the ZIP model
is seen to outperform the more popular probit model.
With a better understanding of what constitutes a more appropriate esti-
mation technique, a process similar to data replication is used on an updated
data set to reconsider the greed versus grievance debate. Using a general
greed-grievance specification, the estimation results provide further support
to the view that both greed and grievance variables matter in explaining civil
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war risk; a contrast to most empirical studies. The finding is also robust to
various specification changes that include alternative measurements of both
the opportunity and grievance variables. The results from this chapter im-
plies that had scholars recognised sooner the concerns of excess zeroes, which
lead to issues of model misspecification, biased estimates and appropriate es-
timators, the potential path of the determinants of civil conflict debate might
be very different today.
5.2 Policy Implications
From a policy perspective there are important implications in all three chap-
ters. Military spending has both short and long-term impacts on economic
development that is not limited by income or development levels. Since this
negative effect of military expenditure is quite universal, it is implied that
governments looking to pursue growth need to cut their defence budgets.
Evidence of this has already been witnessed amid austerity measures in the
West - i.e. North America, West and Central Europe and Oceania. Military
spending having no positive effects suggest that policy makers should not
use military expenditure as a reason to pursue economic growth, but rather
look to divert these funds to other areas such as education, infrastructure
or healthcare. It must be noted that while the finding in chapter two shows
military expenditure to have an overwhelmingly negative effect on growth,
countries should not completely omit it from their budget. Security (inter-
nal and external) is seen as vital to economic growth, and defence spending
should be viewed as a means to maintain it.
Turning to chapter three, two major policy implications can be noted
from the empirical results on the investigation of conflict spillovers. First,
since the costs of armed conflict can only be felt by contiguous neighbours
and not non-contiguous neighbours within the conflict vicinity, governments,
international donors or organisations implementing policies targeting conflict
recovery should prioritise host nations and contiguous neighbours. Moreover,
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evidence suggests that irrespective of the amount or type of assistance aid
needed, these various institutions must consider all types of armed conflict
and not just the most violent ones.
Finally, the findings in chapter four can be regarded as imperative to un-
derstanding the etiology of civil war, how to prevent future wars and creating
a initial foundation for persistent economic growth. Implications to chapter
four’s finding that civil conflict occurrence is likely to be explained by both
greed (e.g income, natural resources) and grievance (e.g. social and income
inequality, ethnic fractionalisation, democracy) variables is two-fold. Firstly,
over and above the growth and income related challenges, addressing issues
on social inequality could greatly reduce civil war risk. Secondly, since half
of all civil wars are post-conflict collapses, these greed and grievance vari-
ables which explain civil war can be seen to offer some insight on the types
of societies that remain in the aftermath of a civil conflict. A case of low
income, slow economic growth, poor social structure (e.g. social alienation),
absence of democracy, and high inequality are potentially just some charac-
teristics that not only cause civil conflict, but are left behind post-conflict.
Thus, there is a need for scholars and policy makers to address issues of
post-conflict recovery and relapse inconjunction with causes of civil war.
5.3 Suggestions for Future Research
This thesis has provided a clear and concise foundation between the topics of
military spending, armed conflict and economic growth, paving the way for
innovative future research. From a military spending and growth nexus per-
spective, future research can investigate the issue of endogeneity. Questions
have always been raised regarding the exogeneity of the military spending
variable in the growth equation, with scholars arguing that since military ex-
penditure is part of a governments budget, it will be affected by changes in
growth. Here the focus will be on the creation of a suitable instrument which
is correlated with military spending, but uncorrelated with growth. Another
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fruitful research extension is to find the turning point of military spending.
This turning point will represent the optimal amount of military spending
needed for security purposes, but also enough to not hinder developmental
opportunities.
While the analysis in chapter four found armed conflict in a host country to
have substantially negative spillover impacts on directly contiguous nations,
it would be useful for future research to assess the sources of these spillovers.
Empirical work should proceed towards testing whether these spillover effects
are primarily through channels of capital, labour, trade or conflict; hence
providing researchers and policy makers with a clearer understanding of the
spillover dynamics. Although the findings here suggest the spillover effects
to be limited to contiguous neighbours, there is uncertainty about the exact
distance of this effect. It would be interesting to determine at what distance
from the host nation the spillover effect become significant and how many
non-contiguous countries it would include.
Continuing with research on armed conflict, from a determinants perspec-
tive, more effort needs to be invested in recognising the heterogeneity in the
observations (e.g. dependent variable) that have so often been treated as
homogeneous. Moreover, researchers should look to explore the heteroge-
neous processes that are generating these various zeroes and how to model
this from a theoretical perspective. Since the results from updated datasets
challenge the previously held consensus, scholars can also use this initiative
and explore new avenues, where the focus can shift towards understanding
more about the grievance variables. Lastly, as mentioned, considering that
over half of all civil wars are post conflict collapses, research on one cannot
exist without the other and thus any future research on determinants of civil
war should reflect a consideration of post-conflict societies.
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Table A.1: List of Countries in Full Sample
Africa Asia & Oceania Europe Americas Middle East
Algeria Australia Albania Argentina Bahrain
Angola Bangladesh Austria Belize Iran
Botswana Brunei Belgium Bolivia Israel
Burkina FasoCambodia Bulgaria Brazil Jordan
Burundi China, P. R. Cyprus Canada Kuwait
Cameroon Fiji Denmark Chile Lebanon
Djibouti India Finland Colombia Oman
Egypt Indonesia France Dom. Rep Saudi Arabia
Ethiopia Japan Germany Ecuador Syria
Ghana Korea, South Greece El Salvador
Kenya Malaysia Hungary Guatemala
Lesotho Mongolia Ireland Haiti
Madagascar Nepal Italy Jamaica
Malawi New Zealand Luxembourg Mexico
Mali Pakistan Malta Nicaragua
Mauritania P.N. Guinea Netherlands Panama
Mauritius Philippines Poland Paraguay
Morocco Singapore Portugal Peru
Mozambique Sri Lanka Romania Uruguay












Table A.2: List of Countries in Various Sub-samples
High Inc Med Inc Low Inc Conflict Civil War
Australia Albania Angola Algeria Algeria
Austria Algeria Bangladesh Angola Angola
Bahrain Argentina Belize Australia Bangladesh
Belgium Botswana Bolivia Bangladesh Burundi
Canada Brazil Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia
Cyprus Brunei Burundi Cambodia Colombia
Denmark Bulgaria Cambodia Cameroon Djibouti
Finland Chile Cameroon Colombia Egypt
France China, P. R. Djibouti Cameroon Ethiopia
Germany Colombia Egypt Colombia Guatamala
Greece Dom. Rep. El Salvador India India
Hungary Ecuador Ethiopia Indonesia Indonesia
Ireland Iran Fiji Iran Iran
Israel Jamaica Ghana Israel Israel
Italy Jordan Guatamala Kuwait Lebanon
Japan Lebanon Haiti Lebanon Mali
Korea. S Malaysia India Mali Morocco
Kuwait Mauritius Indonesia Morocco Mozambique
Luxembourg Mexico Kenya Mozambique Nepal
Malta Namibia Lesotho Nepal Nicaragua
Netherlands Panama Madagascar Nicaragua Pakistan
Norway Peru Malawi Nigeria Paraguay
Oman Romania Mali Pakistan Peru
Poland Russia Mauritania Paraguay Philippines
Portugal Seychelles Mongolia Peru Russia
Saudi Arabia S. Africa Morocco Philippines Rwanda
Singapore Thailand Mozambique Russia Senegal
Spain Tunisia Nepal Rwanda Sierra Leone
Sweden Turkey Nicaragua Senegal S. Africa
Switzerland Uruguay Nigeria Sierra Leone Sri Lanka
U.K. Venezuela Pakistan S. Africa Turkey












Table A.3: List of Countries in Various Sub-samples
Nat. No Nat. Resources Aid Received
Algeria Albania Malawi Albania Malta
Angola Argentina Malaysia Algeria Mauritania
Australia Austria Malta Angola Mauritius
Bahrain Bangladesh Mauritius Bahrain Mongolia
Belize Belgium Mexico Bangladesh Morocco
Bolivia Brazil Morocco Belize Mozambique
Botswana Bulgaria Nepal Bolivia Namibia
Brunei Burundi Netherlands Botswana Nepal
Burkina Faso Cambodia New Zealand Burkina Faso Nicaragua
Cameroon Canada Nicaragua Burundi Nigeria
Chile China, P.R Pakistan Cambodia Oman
Colombia Cyprus Panama Cameroon Pakistan
Ecuador Denmark Paraguay Chile Panama
Egypt Djibouti Philippines Colombia P.N Guinea
Ghana Dom. Rep. Poland Djibouti Paraguay
Iran El Salvador Portugal Dom. Rep. Peru
Israel Ethiopia Romania Ecuador Philippines
Jamaica Fiji Seychelles Egypt Rwanda
Kuwait Finland Singapore El Salvador Senegal
Mali France Spain Ethiopia Seychelles
Mauritania Germany Sri Lanka Fiji Sierra Leone
Mongolia Greece Swaziland Ghana S. Africa
Mozambique Guatemala Sweden Guatemala Sri Lanka
Namibia Haiti Switzerland Haiti Swaziland
Nigeria Hungary Thailand India Syria
Norway India Tunisia Indonesia Tanzania
Oman Indonesia Turkey Iran Thailand
P.N Guinea Ireland U.K. Israel Tunisia
Peru Italy Uganda Jamaica Uganda
Russia Japan U.S.A. Jordan Uruguay
Rwanda Jordan Uruguay Kenya
Saudi Arabia Kenya Lebanon
Senegal Korea. S Lesotho
Sierra Leone Lebanon Madagascar




Table A.4: List of Countries in Various Sub-samples
No Aid Open Closed Interstate War
Argentina Albania Madagascar Argentina Australia
Australia Algeria Malawi Australia Cameroon
Austria Angola Malaysia Bangladesh Ecuador
Belgium Austria Malta Brazil Ethiopia
Brazil Bahrain Mauritania Burkina Faso India
Brunei Belgium Mauritius Burundi Iran
Bulgaria Belize Mexico Cameroon Kuwait
Canada Bolivia Mongolia China, P.R Nigeria
China, P.R Botswana Morocco Colombia Pakistan
Cyprus Brunei Mozambique Egypt Peru
Denmark Bulgaria Namibia Ethiopia U.K.
Finland Cambodia Netherlands India U.S.A.
France Canada New Zealand Iran
Germany Chile Nicaragua Japan
Greece Cyprus Nigeria Nepal
Hungary Denmark Norway Pakistan
Ireland Djibouti Oman Peru
Italy Dom. Rep. Panama Rwanda
Japan Ecuador P.N. Guinea Turkey
Korea. S El Salvador Paraguay Uganda
Kuwait Fiji Sri Lanka U.S.A
Luxembourg Finland Poland Uruguay
Mexico France Portugal Venezuela
Netherlands Germany Romania
New Zealand Greece Russia
Norway Guatemala Saudi Arabia
Poland Haiti Senegal
Portugal Hungary Seychelles
Romania Indonesia Sierra Leone
Russia Ireland Singapore
Saudi ArabiaIsrael S. Africa
Singapore Italy Spain
Spain Jamaica Sri Lanka
Sweden Jordan Swaziland
Switzerland Kenya Sweden





Table A.5: Growth Effects of Military Expenditure, Stratifying for Conflict
and Income
(1) (2) (3)
Sample Conflict & Low Conflict & Medium Conflict & High
Variables ∆ly ∆ly ∆ly
∆lk 0.021† 0.189** 0.087**
(0.011) (0.026) (0.028)
∆lm -0.034** -0.019 -0.113**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.031)
lngdpop -0.030* -0.014 -0.070*
(0.015) (0.061) (0.029)
ly1 -0.106** -0.147** -0.449**
(0.014) (0.032) (0.048)
lk1 0.025** 0.032 0.092**
(0.009) (0.020) (0.027)
lm1 -0.028** -0.006 -0.057**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.015)
Constant -5.793** -6.131** -11.228
(0.782) (1.496) (1.925)
Trend Yes Yes Yes
LR Coefficient -0.264 -0.041 -0.127
Observations 487 190 98
R-squared 0.214 0.402 0.574
Dependent variable: ∆ly; Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1
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Table A.6: Growth Effects of Military Expenditure, Stratifying for Trade
Openness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Open 2000 Closed 2000 Open 2010 Closed 2010
Variables ∆ly ∆ly ∆ly ∆ly
∆lk 0.053** 0.162** 0.058** 0.180**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.016)
∆lm -0.033** -0.011 -0.026** -0.019†
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
lngdpop -0.048** -0.064** -0.052** -0.063**
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
ly1 -0.103** -0.061** -0.079** -0.176**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.021)
lk1 0.024** 0.050** 0.027** 0.068**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012)
lm1 -0.023** -0.007 -0.015** -0.013*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Constant -3.021** -4.007** -3.042** -5.994**
(0.496) (0.610) (0.459) (0.770)
Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
LR Coefficient -0.223 -0.115 -0.190 -0.074
Observations 1656 508 1762 402
R-squared 0.127 0.331 0.111 0.414
Dependent variable: ∆ly; Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1
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A.2 Appendix for Chapter 3
Figure A.1: Map of Africa: An Example on the Choice of Primary and
Secondary Neighbours
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Table A.7: Growth Effects of Conflict using Returns to Human Capital (Penn
World Tables 8.0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Type Conflict Intense Civil
Variables ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y
∆ ln(inv) 0.036** 0.036** 0.036** 0.036**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
∆ ln(edu) -0.073** -0.069* -0.067* -0.070**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
ln(n+ g + δ) 0.092** 0.089** 0.090** 0.093**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
ln(y0) -0.024** -0.026** -0.026** -0.025**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ln(invt−1) 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(edut−1) -0.023** -0.021** -0.022** -0.022**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Conflict -0.015** -0.024** -0.012*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Year 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.989** -1.922** -1.968** -1.967**
(0.540) (0.538) (0.538) (0.539)
Observation 1765 1765 1765 1765
R-squared 0.096 0.102 0.101 0.100
Notes: Dependent variable: ∆ ln y; All regressions include time trend variable;
Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1
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Table A.8: Growth Effects of Conflict with Combined Political and Economic
Contiguity Matrices
(1) (2) (3)
Conflict: Conflict Intense Civil
Weight: Polity + Trade Polity + Trade Polity + Trade
Pri Border Border Border
Sec Dist Dist Dist
Variables ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y
Conflict -0.014** 0.022** -0.012**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
WpriConfpri -0.010* -0.014* -0.013**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
WsecConfsec -0.007 -0.006 -0.010
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Constant -1.838** -1.851** -2.045**
(0.538) (0.540) (0.540)
Observations 1765 1765 1765
R-Squared 0.105 0.104 0.104
Notes: Dependent variable: ∆ ln y; Variable y0 represents lagged dependent
variable (e.g. ln(61)− ln(60)) and is interpreted as initial income; All regres-
sions include time trend variable; Clustered standard errors in parentheses;
Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1
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Table A.9: Growth Effects of Conflict using Different Datasets and Removing
Outlier Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict Type: Conflict Intense Civil
Weight Type: Polity Trade Polity Trade Polity Trade
Pri Border Border Border Border Border Border
Sec Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist
Variables ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y
Conflict -0.016** -0.016** -0.028** -0.028** -0.013* -0.013*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
WpriConfpri -0.011
† -0.009† -0.019* -0.014† -0.011* -0.012*
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
WsecConfsec -0.001 -0.006 -0.014 -0.002 -0.011 -0.008
(0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Constant -2.202** -2.159** -2.119** -2.195** -2.344** -2.233**
(0.562) (0.563) (0.565) (0.564) (0.564) (0.564)
Observations 1635 1635 1635 1635 1635 1635
R-squared 0.112 0.113 0.115 0.113 0.110 0.111
Notes: Dependent variable: ∆ ln y; Variable y0 represents lagged dependent
variable (e.g. ln(61)− ln(60)) and is interpreted as initial income; All regres-
sions include time trend variable; Clustered standard errors in parentheses;
Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1
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Table A.10: Growth Effects of Conflict Following Murdoch and Sandler
(2002) and de Groot (2010)’s Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict Type: Conflict Intense Civil
Weight Type: Polity Trade Polity Trade Polity Trade
Pri Border Border Border Border Border Border
Sec Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist
Variables ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y
ln(invest) 0.022** 0.022** 0.020** -0.020** 0.021** 0.022**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(edu) -0.020** -0.021** -0.020** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(n+ g + δ) 0.089** 0.090** 0.092** 0.089** 0.092** 0.093**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
ln(y0) -0.030** -0.030** -0.029** -0.028** -0.029** -0.028**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Conflict -0.015** -0.015** -0.023** -0.024** -0.012* -0.012*
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
WpriConfpri -0.013* -0.011* -0.016* -0.011
† -0.014* -0.013**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
WsecConfsec -0.005 -0.009 -0.020 -0.005 -0.014 -0.011
†
(0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Constant -1.866** -1.842** -1.765** -1.857** -2.018** -1.926**
(0.536) (0.535) (0.538) (0.538) (0.537) (0.536)
Observations 1768 1768 1768 1768 1768 1768
R-squared 0.097 0.098 0.098 0.095 0.096 0.097
Notes: Dependent variable: ∆ ln y; Variable y0 represents lagged dependent
variable (e.g. ln(61)− ln(60)) and is interpreted as initial income; All regres-
sions include time trend variable; Clustered standard errors in parentheses;
Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1
124
Table A.11: Growth Effects of Conflict using Conflict Duration, with Polity
and Trade Contiguity Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Conflict Type: Conflict Intense Civil
Weight Type: Polity Trade Polity Trade Polity Trade
Pri Border Border Border Border Border Border
Sec Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist Dist
Variables ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y ∆ ln y
Conflict -0.015** -0.015** -0.023** -0.024** -0.012* -0.012*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
WpriConfpri -0.004 -0.009* -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006)
WsecConfsec -0.005 -0.002 -0.009 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.021) (0.022) (0.001) (0.007)
Constant -1.829** -1.748** -1.899** -1.915** -1.937** -1.891**
(0.541) (0.542) (0.540) (0.540) (0.539) (0.541)
Observations 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765
R-squared 0.103 0.104 0.102 0.101 0.099 0.099
Notes: Dependent variable: ∆ ln y; Variable y0 represents lagged dependent
variable (e.g. ln(61)− ln(60)) and is interpreted as initial income; All regres-
sions include time trend variable; Clustered standard errors in parentheses;
Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1
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Table A.12: List of Countries and Conflict Years






Central African Republic 4 3
Congo DR 17 10
Congo Republic 5 1


















Sierre Leone 11 0










A.3 Appendix for Chapter 4





Pri Exports/GDP 10.566* 10.889**
(3.835) (4.107)
Pri Exports/GDP2 -20.787* -22.812*
(8.646) (10.493)
log real GDP -0.0002** -0.0002* 0.0018*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006)
RGDPPC Growth -0.0723** -0.1461**
(0.0270) (0.034)
Polity Index (1 lag) -0.0105 0.0341* 0.0674*
(0.0183) (0.0189) (0.0301)
Polity Index2 (1 lag) 0.0030 0.0133*
(0.0039) (0.0055)
Ethic Dominance 0.3619 0.5265* 1.0852
(0.2909) (0.2433) (0.7788)
Log Population 0.4290** 0.4291** -1.1070**
(0.1217) (0.1222) (0.3131)
War in Past 10 Years 0.7353** 1.4194**
(0.2137) (0.2629)
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Zero Observations - 692
Log likelihood -184.481 -211.817
Wald χ2 51.82 -
Vuong test - 3.68
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,
† p<0.1
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log real GDP -0.092* -0.409** -0.070 0.416* -0.306** 0.249*
(0.042) (0.064) (0.042) (0.061) (0.069) (0.114)
RGDPPC Growth -2.079** -2.067 -2.342** -1.418 -3.080** -2.343
(0.589) (1.837) (0.623) (1.198) (0.723) (1.809)
log % Mountains 0.127** 0.101** 0.137**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.038)
Grievance
Polity Index 0.043** 0.078** 0.044** 0.073** 0.080** 0.318**
(0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.062)
Polity Index2 -0.004** -0.003** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Eth Frac (F&L) 5.265** 1.191** 5.367** 1.187** 5.254** 1.123
(0.737) (0.384) (0.741) (0.374) (1.037) (0.656)
Eth Frac2 (F&L) -4.392** -4.288** -4.908**
(0.672) (0.673) (1.007)
ldg 0.436* -12.58** 0.374* -12.39** 1.169** -20.61**
(0.191) (1.704) (0.192) (1.621) (0.288) (3.585)
Continued on next page
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Table A.14 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
ZIP ZIP ZIP
Outcome Inflation Outcome Inflation Outcome Inflation
phi -0.094 0.596** -0.103 0.589** -0.103 1.246**
(0.091) (0.091) (0.098) (0.088) (0.105) (0.185)
nhi 0.224* -0.710** 0.195** -0.774** 0.381** -0.261
(0.072) (0.210) (0.072) (0.225) (0.097) (0.244)
Controls
log Population 0.126** -0.966** 0.104* -0.943** 0.233** -1.291**
(0.049) (0.086) (0.048) (0.081) (0.097) (0.198)
Cold War -0.117 -0.095 -0.225*
(0.073) (0.075) (0.095)
Africa 0.126 0.172 0.630**
(0.096) (0.096) (0.143)
Constant -2.768** 5.591** -2.788** 5.128** 0.389 13.058**
(0.742) (1.091) (0.754) (1.000) (1.855) (2.997)
Observations 4460 4460 2478
Zero Observations 3543 3543 1910
Log likelihood -2335.26 -2341.71 -1308.27
Vuong test 8.16 8.13 7.13
Notes: Dependent variable: Conflict prevalence; Standard errors in parenthe-
ses; Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,† p<0.1; ldg = largest discriminated
ethnic group, phi = positive horizontal inequality (relative gap between mean
national income and income level of the richest group), nhi = negative hori-
zontal inequality (relative gap between mean national income and income level
of the poorest group)
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Outcome Inflation Outcome Inflation Outcome Inflation
Opportunity
log real GDP -0.066* 0.403**
(0.032) (0.056)
RGDPPC Growth -2.262** 0.774
(0.457) (0.822)






Urbanisation Rate -0.103* 1.217**
(0.049) (0.242)
Life Expectancy -0.887** 1.861**
(0.233) (0.575)
∆Life Expectancy -7.353** 8.988
(2.280) (6.213)
log % Mountains 0.048* 0.075** 0.079**
(0.029) (0.024) (0.026)
Grievance
Polity Index 0.034** 0.277** 0.032** 0.102**
(0.006) (0.058) (0.007) (0.028)




Eth Frac (F&L) 5.702** 0.253 6.011** 1.116** 5.859** 1.346**
Continued on next page
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Table A.15 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3)
ZIP ZIP ZIP
Outcome Inflation Outcome Inflation Outcome Inflation
(0.658) (0.472) (0.669) (0.403) (0.733) (0.372)
Eth Frac2 (F&L) -4.570** -4.710** -4.526**
(0.593) (0.603) (0.674)
ldg 1.134** -17.76** 0.767* -11.63** 0.476** -12.89**
(0.139) (2.687) (0.187) (2.006) (0.181) (1.645)
phi -0.199* 1.153** -0.186* 0.717** -0.178* 0.575**
(0.077) (0.167) (0.081) (0.089) (0.081) (0.075)
nhi 0.185** -0.652* 0.207** -0.439† 0.203** -0.773**
(0.064) (0.268) (0.074) (0.283) (0.072) (0.242)
Controls
log Population 0.093** -0.703** 0.031 -0.642** 0.072 -0.967**
(0.294) (0.085) (0.032) (0.089) (0.046) (0.077)
Cold War -0.197** -0.239** -0.222**
(0.064) (0.072) (0.068)
Africa 0.057 -0.066 0.200*
(0.083) (0.088) (0.095)
Constant -3.802** 4.673** 0.574 1.667 -2.647** 5.228**
(0.549) (1.350) (1.048) (2.327) (0.701) (0.865)
Observations 5083 4998 4446
Zero Observations 4018 3945 3528
Log likelihood -2775.87 -2730.70 -2342.33
Vuong test 9.47 7.97 8.46
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels:** p<0.01,* p<0.05,†
p<0.1; ldg = largest discriminated ethnic group, phi = positive horizontal
inequality (relative gap between mean national income and income level of the
richest group), nhi = negative horizontal inequality (relative gap between mean
national income and income level of the poorest group)
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